TRADER DOSSIER — TJ "The Wheel Deal"

Single source of truth. Supersedes the old TJWHEELDEAL_SOP.md and TJWHEELDEAL_RESEARCH.md, which have been merged into this file. Last updated: 2026-08-16

⚡ THE PLAYBOOK — run the strategy in 7 steps

Everything below is expanded, sourced and quoted in Part I. This is the executable version.

The whole thing in one line

Sell puts on stocks you'd be glad to own → get assigned → sell calls above your adjusted cost basis → roll forever, never deliver the shares → use the premium to buy more shares.


STEP 1 — Pick the stock (3 gates, all must pass)

#GateFail = don't trade it
1"If it dropped 50% tomorrow, would I be excited to buy more?"If no → skip entirely
2Investment or cash grab? Decide honestly, write it downLying here is what blows people up
3Can I commit 100 shares? ($100 stock = $10,000)Options force full-lot size

STEP 2 — Size it (never all at once)

TrancheDeployWhen
125%Entry
225%It dips (~10% lower)
350%It really dips

🚨 Hard ceiling: daily theta ≤ 0.75% of account net liq. Above that you are oversized and volatility will eventually take you out.

STEP 3 — Sell the put

SettingValue
Days out30–45 DTE
Delta20 if you don't want the shares · 30–40 if you do
RSI30–35 (oversold)
Price vs 200-day MAStrike below it. Already below? Use the 50-day
BollingerEnter at the lower band
EarningsAvoid unless you're happy to be assigned
Target return~3–4% on capital per cycle (~1%+/week)

MANAGESTEP 4 — Manage it

TriggerAction
75% of premium captured (and time left)Close it
21 DTEManage — treat this as your real expiration
Barely any premium leftLet it expire. Don't pay to close
Better trade availableRun PPD: remaining premium ÷ remaining days. If a new trade beats it, redeploy

STEP 5 — If it goes against you

SituationAction
Still above break-evenDo nothing. Not a problem yet
Break-even breachedRoll — down and out
Extrinsic value < 10% of option priceRoll — assignment is near
Stock cratersDeploy the next tranche ~10% lower
Buying power squeezedTrim or roll. BP is the real risk limit
Thesis actually brokeTake the loss, move on

Roll cost floor: net credit ≥ $0. Never pay a debit — unless you can name the capital appreciation it buys (see Step 7).

STEP 6 — If assigned, sell the covered call

SettingValue
Adjusted cost basisShare price paid − all premium collected
StrikeABOVE adjusted cost basis. Never below
Delta15–25
RSI~70 (overbought) — sell into strength, a 5–10% up day
vs 200-day MAStrike above it (acts as resistance)
TenorShort (~2 weeks) — keeps roll flexibility

DEFENDSTEP 7 — Defend the shares

The shares are not for sale. You sell calls to collect rent, not to exit.
SituationAction
Call ITM but below break-evenDo nothing
Break-even breachedRoll up and out — a month, a year, whatever it takes
Stock keeps runningKeep rolling. "Roll right until I'm right"
Rolling up in strikeTake size off — ~500 contracts per roll
Need to pay a debit?Only if (strike gain × shares) >> debit

Justify every roll before you place it: what capital appreciation does this buy, and does it exceed the cost?


🔁 Scenario quick-reference

If this happens……do this
Put expires worthlessSell another. Repeat
Put assignedFine — that was the plan. Go to Step 6
Stock rips after you sold a putYou made max profit. Move on. Don't chase
Stock rips after you sold a callRoll up + out for ≥$0 credit, cut size
Stock drops 10%Tranche 2
Stock drops 30%+Tranche 3, sell calls above adjusted basis
Called awayYou won. Restart the wheel
Position dominates the accountYou're oversized — check the 0.75% rule
Down and stuck"The more you go underwater, the harder to come up for air" — roll before it's deep

PART I — STRATEGY SOP (what he says he does)

Not financial advice. This documents what one public trader says he does. He is compensated via a tastytrade referral link and a paid community, and he posts wins more visibly than losses. Verify everything before risking capital.

0. THE PHILOSOPHY — in his own taglines

Source: N1kmiAHfupc 🟢

"Sell puts, sell calls, collect premium, roll when it makes dollars and cents. That's the tagline for the channel."
"It's not about owning stock. It's about knowing how to make money off that stock.… It's not about an allegiance to a certain company or a certain stock. It's about can you make money with that ticker, and how can you mirror the deltas? Because when you own a share, it's one delta."

That last clause is the mental model underneath everything: shares are just delta-1, and options let you synthesize, hedge, or rent that delta.


ENTER0z. 🔵 THE ENTRY GATE — the 50% drawdown test

Source: UCU7vpxHB6Y 🟢. Apply this before the investment/cash-grab split.

"Oftentimes we're prisoners of the price movement. I had a mentor tell me: before you get into a position, ask yourself — are you going to like it if it's a 50% drawdown? How do you feel about it if you buy it right here and it crashes 50%? Are you still going to be excited about it, to really scoop up more? If the answer is no, then maybe you don't need to be trying to get into it, period — because you only like it if it goes up."

This is the honest-categorization test made concrete, and it's what the 25/25/50 sizing (§2) is built to survive. If you wouldn't gladly deploy tranche 3 at −50%, the position doesn't belong in the "investment" bucket.

He also weighs market sentiment at entry:

"If the market hates a stock, they will continue to hate a stock no matter what… market sentiment is a real thing — it's one of the [things] I evaluate whenever I get in."

0y. ⚫ "THE RICH MAN'S COVERED CALL" — his signature structure

Source: KDC0WNX0RUY 🟢. Another term he coined himself. This explains the naked-calls-on-top-of-short-puts structure seen all over his live positions.

The standard "poor man's covered call" (PMCC): buy a LEAP, then sell short calls against it. You pay premium to open.

His inversion — the rich man's covered call: sell the LEAP.

"Whenever you buy a LEAP and then start selling calls on top of that LEAP, that is called the poor man's covered call. I am calling this the RICH MAN'S covered call. This is whenever you SELL the LEAP at a strike price and you're like, 'Dude, give me those shares, Mr. Market. Please give me those shares because I want to own them at that price.'"

Why the naked calls sit on top

"Why the naked calls on top of the puts? Because those naked calls are essentially a hedge to the downside. In my mind it's almost like buying puts, except I want to COLLECT premium. I don't ever want to pay premium, because I am a premium collector."

Why he claims it beats the PMCC

"The rich man's covered call, if managed correctly, is superior to the poor man's covered call, because you're collecting theta the whole way through and you're collecting premiums. You're a NET PREMIUM SELLER, versus having to pay premium by initiating the position by buying the LEAP. I want to SELL the LEAP."
Poor man's CCRich man's CC (his)
LEAPBuy itSell it
Premium flow at openPay (debit)Collect (credit)
ThetaWorks against you on the LEAPWorks for you throughout
CapitalSmallLarge (needs the collateral)
Wants assignment?NoYes — that's the point

The cost-basis math he walks through

"Bring in a million in premiums, so now the adjusted cost basis is $9 million. Then add the $620,000 already collected for entering the contracts in the first place — now you're at like $8.4 million adjusted cost basis [8.380]."

→ Every premium dollar collected lowers the effective purchase price of the shares he intends to own. The structure is a financed accumulation vehicle, not a directional trade.


PORTFOLIO0x. 🚨 PORTFOLIO MARGIN — the caveat that reframes every return figure

Source: jq7RoT8qW2I 🟢. Read this before believing any % in this dossier.

"On tastytrade, because we have portfolio margin, it's a lot more capital efficient to place the same trade, collect the same premium, but you're only tying up $128,000 versus $1.6 [million] right off the bat. That's considered a gimme."

That is roughly a 12× reduction in capital tied up for an identical position.

Implications:

He uses "gimmes and gotchas" as his standard framing when walking through a structure: the capital efficiency is the gimme; the assignment/margin exposure is the gotcha.


0w. 🔵 SIMPLICITY DOCTRINE — only four things

Source: m9SPRYpsFFs 🟢

"There's only four things you can do with options: buy calls, buy puts, sell calls, sell puts. Everything else is a combination of all of that. …That's why I never use things like verticals, diagonals, calendars and all this other crazy — because I feel like you lose 90% of the audience when you talk like that."

He deliberately avoids the exotic-name vocabulary (jade lizards, flying saucers, etc.) even when he's effectively trading those structures.

The 100-share commitment gate

Source: ugxgiyUImv4 🟢

"It's got to be 100 shares worth because of my strategy… it's an oversized bet, it's not just doing the one-share rule. You've got to commit to 100. So if you're talking about a $100 stock, that's a $10,000 investment right off the jump — that's nothing to sneeze at. So I'm like, let me take a serious look at whether or not I even think they have a moat."

Options force a 100-share minimum commitment, which is why the moat/quality question has to be answered before the trade — you can't dip a toe.


0a. The three spokes of the wheel — and the mistake most people make

Source: t8dWwkoGRds 🟢

"That's the three spokes of the wheel: the cash-secured put premium, the covered call premium, and the capital appreciation."

The third spoke is the one he insists people miss:

"If you're averse to owning shares — you consider it a bad thing — then in reality you're not a Wheeler, you're a cash-secured put seller. And that's cool, but your upside is only the premium you receive. You did not participate in any capital appreciation."
"The biggest alpha is always going to be in owning the shares and writing those up… I always like to have exposure to the upside because ultimately the market trends up. There's 150 years of historical data that supports that." (0x693LMgoB8)

PORTFOLIO0b. ⚫ PORTFOLIO RISK — the 0.75% theta rule (his hardest-won lesson)

Source: 0x693LMgoB8 🟢 — the single most important risk rule in this dossier.

He tried sizing to 1% of net liq per day in theta and it blew up on him:

"I had this rule of 1%. We got a $10 million account, I want to collect $100,000 a day in premium and theta. Yep. That rule did not work. And they told me it wasn't going to work and I didn't believe them. Dr. Jim Schultz — he's done videos on this — he says the rule is 0.5% and that's on the high end. So we finally landed in the middle. I'm at 0.75. I don't want to exceed 0.75% because if you're exceeding 0.75% of your net liquidation value on your theta per day, you're supersized. You're oversized, and it's just a matter of time before the Vega is going to bite you in the ass."
Daily theta as % of net liqVerdict
0.50%Dr. Jim Schultz's number — "the high end"
0.75%TJ's ceiling. Do not exceed.
1.00%What he tried. Failed.

Why it fails — the Greeks cascade

"[A drop] is going to accelerate the delta, and it's like a snowball… the bigger it gets going downhill it becomes unstoppable. And you got your vega, then this other tertiary Greek called vanna that's going to accelerate the vega, and things can spiral out of control very, very quickly."

DEFENDBuying power is the binding constraint


0c. 🟡 TAIL RISK — why he stops at 21 DTE

Source: 0x693LMgoB8, t8dWwkoGRds 🟢

"The first 50% of the money that you collect is a lot easier to capture than the second 50%, and that second 50% is called your tail risk. So tastytrade promotes: sell options 30 to 45 days out, manage them 21 days to expiration, and you can likely capture that first 50% and you don't have to deal with the tail risk. Pretend like your expiration date is actually 21 days out."

⚠️ Tension to be aware of: in CASH SECURED PUTS 101 he states a 70–75% capture target (§3). Here he describes the tastytrade 50% framing. In 3CiMGl2Gvm0 he splits the difference:

"If I collect a thousand dollars of premium, ideally I'm okay giving back three or four hundred dollars and just profiting the 600–700s. You won't go broke making a profit in this business."

→ Practical read: target 60–75% capture, and treat 21 DTE as the hard stop.


SELECT0. The one decision that drives everything: categorize the ticker

Before any trade, every ticker goes in one of two buckets, honestly:

BucketMeaningBehavior
Investment"Willing to rock with this thing through thick and thin for 3–5 years"Wants assignment. Builds share count. Never-sell shares.
Cash grabPremium only, no desire to ownWants the option to expire worthless. Avoids assignment.
"If you are willing to be honest with yourself and properly categorize each ticker you are set up… to manufacture the win. But if you are lying to yourself… the minute that it dips you're going to freak out."

Rule: have BOTH an entry strategy and an exit strategy on day one.

"This isn't 'I'm going to play it as it goes based on the price action.' You already need to have your investment thesis intact when you land on this stock."

ENTER1. Cash-secured put — entry mechanics

ParameterSetting
Days to expiration (DTE)Sell 30–45 DTE
Management triggerManage at 21 DTE
Profit targetCapture 70–75% of premium collected
Delta — cash grab20 delta ("if I'm cash grabbing and I don't want a lot of stress")
Delta — wants sharesup to 40 delta ("very bullish… might as well get paid as much money trying to own it")
Cash-grab return target~30% annualized
WeeklysAvoided — worth only ~1–1.5% more annualized, "more work," Greeks far more volatile

ENTERTechnical entry filters (all from the CSP 101 video)


PORTFOLIO2. Position sizing — the "25/25/50" rule

Source: t8dWwkoGRds 🟢 — stated precisely here, in three tranches:

"I have a 25-25-50 rule. It's 25% of the total capital that I would like to allocate to the position. If it dips, then we deploy the other 25%. And then if it really dips, then I deploy the rest — the 50% that's left."
Tranche% of intended allocationTrigger
125%Initial entry
225%First meaningful dip (~10% lower)
350%Deep dip — the "really dips" tranche

Note the back-loading: half the capital is reserved for the deepest level. He enters small and buys heaviest into weakness — the opposite of averaging in evenly.

Never deploy the full allocation at once. Keep dry powder to average down.

  1. Open with 25% of the intended allocation
  2. If it drops, deploy the second 25% bullet to lower average cost — and start selling covered calls
  3. Price each new put roughly 10% below the crashed price
  4. Go heavier at the deepest rung
Worked example he gave: sell the CSP at $10 (25% of allocation) → stock tanks to $8 → sell more puts at $7 with the next 25% → tanks further → "go heavy" at $5.

This is why his live positions look like ladders — staggered strikes and expiries on one underlying (e.g. his MSTR call ladder: 125C Oct 16 / 165C Nov 20 / 165C Dec 18 / 225C Jan 15, 250 contracts per rung).


DEFEND2b. 🔴 THE ROLL TRIGGERS — consolidated

Three distinct triggers, in priority order. Sources: 0x693LMgoB8, IsnBJjjE8DY, WxuMkA6neGI 🟢

Trigger 1 — 21 DTE (the routine one)

"21 days to expiration is typically when I like to manage the options, provided that one of the strikes isn't being challenged or compromised."

Trigger 2 — break-even breached (the defensive one)

"If the strike is breached, then I look at my break-even. Let's say my strike is 20 and I got paid $2 in premium, so my break-even's 22. … Whenever my break-even is breached, that's typically when I roll."
PositionStrikePremiumBreak-even
Covered call20$222
Cash-secured put18$216
"I look at it a lot like swimming. The more you go underwater, the harder it's going to be to come up for air. You could drown if you get too far underwater."

DEFENDTrigger 3 — the 10% extrinsic rule (assignment risk)

"My rule of thumb is 10%. If less than 10% of the option price is extrinsic value, then I'm seriously considering rolling — because I have to look at the couple of dollars I'm going to sacrifice: is that worth the stress I'm about to eliminate? I'm always looking for the path of least resistance. I want to manage less so that I can make more."

Extrinsic value is what's left of the premium above intrinsic value. As it approaches zero the counterparty has no reason not to exercise → assignment risk.

DEFENDRoll early, while gamma is still low

"Another reason why I like to roll my options when I still have quite a bit of time left on the clock, so that these moves aren't so drastic in the pricing of my option." (3CiMGl2Gvm0) — gamma rises sharply near expiry, so a late roll costs far more.

DEFEND2f. 🔴 "I'M GOING TO ROLL RIGHT UNTIL I'M RIGHT"

Source: hF_-zcBo_Aw 🟢 — the single most concise statement of his whole defense.

"I'll consider rolling those covered calls on the 20s expiring January 2026, which is the bulk of the position — 1,000 contracts representing 100,000 shares. I'm going to roll right until I'm right, and that is the long position right there. Going to roll these till 2030, 2035 if necessary."

There is effectively no scenario in which he delivers the core shares. The covered call is a rent contract he intends to refinance indefinitely. This is why §3b (roll on break-even) and §3l (never pay a debit) matter so much — the roll has to stay free if you plan to do it forever.


2g. 🟡 His comparison framework — how he ranks candidate trades

Source: E0SjbB1y9M0 ("PLTR vs HOOD vs NVDA — which strangle makes more dollars & sense?") 🟢. He lines up candidates on a fixed set of columns:

# contracts · strikes · extrinsic value · capital requirements · notional · delta on BOTH sides

Worked PLTR row (single expiry):

FieldValue
Share price~$190
Short puts350 contracts @ 160
Short calls700 contracts @ 260 (= 70,000 shares)
Delta19 put / 12 call
Extrinsic value$183,750 puts / $177,800 calls

Note the deliberate imbalance again (§2c seesaw): 2× the contracts on the call side, but the extrinsic value on each side is nearly equal — that balance is what he's actually solving for.


MANAGE2h. 🟡 Profit zones and probability

Source: 8anZYY_Zf9w 🟢. He frames a strangle as a range the stock must stay inside, with an explicit probability:

"MSTR just needs to trade between 225 and 400. If I roll in about a week — from the 15-day to the 50-day — those 800 contracts are going to pick up easily another $200,000–400,000 in premiums. As long as MSTR trades between 225 and 400 from now till the end of the year, that gets us there. And as far as percentage of happening, I give that more like a 75%."
"The reason I like to trade more is not just because it's less capital intensive, but because you have a lot more flexibility."

2d. 🔴 "The goalpost" — the strangle width tradeoff

Source: N1kmiAHfupc 🟢. He calls the short put + short call pair his goalpost.

"The wider the goalpost, the less the adjustments, the less the credits."
Goalpost widthAdjustments neededPremium collected
WideFewerLess
NarrowMoreMore

The whole game is choosing where on that curve you want to live — and he keeps drifting wider as size grows, because at his size adjustments are the real cost.

What actually happens over a position's life

"I start off here with my goalpost. And then I get the first roll, second roll, third roll, fourth roll, fifth roll — and before you know it, it looks like that. And I'm like, dude, the ball just got to stay in the air, and I'm good. And my expiration date is now like 21 days to expiration. That's really my expiration date now. Why? Because I want to eliminate the tail risk. I want to eliminate the gamma — gamma is not your friend, it's the accelerator of the delta. When it's going your way it's great. When it's not going your way, it's not great at all."

→ A position isn't a trade, it's a campaign of serial rolls, and 21 DTE is treated as the real expiration every cycle.


DEFEND2e. 🔴 SCALE OUT WHILE ROLLING UP — the PayPal campaign

Source: rwXTj1mtNmQ 🟢. A live worked example of managing a large short-put campaign, and the clearest statement of his de-risking logic.

The fork: more premium, or less risk?

"At this point the theta is going to be accelerating like crazy. Then I'm going to look to roll the position out an additional year and move that strike price from 50 to either 47.50 or 45 — because at that point it's the angel and the devil: am I going to go after more premiums and keep the strike at 50, bring in another million dollars in premiums, or am I going to de-risk the position and go from 50 to 47.50 or 45, because we get a lot closer to where we're no longer bluffing — we want to take ownership."

"No longer bluffing" is the tell: rolling down in strike moves the position from cash-grab toward genuine intent to own.

DEFENDRolling UP means taking size OFF — every single time

"Are we going to roll the strike from 50 to 55? From 55 to 60? The answer is yes, but I would take some contracts off the table. Every time I rolled up, I'd probably take 500 contracts off the table. If I roll up again, I'll take another 500 contracts off. And then at that point I'd rock with 1,000 contracts at 60 and be happy with that. And then maybe PayPal would pull back a little, and then I could do it again and scale into it."
ActionSize change
Roll strike up (chasing a rising stock)Reduce contracts each roll
Stock pulls backScale back in

This is the counterweight to the 0.75% theta cap (§0b): as a position moves against him he shrinks it rather than doubling the short premium.


DEFEND2c. 🔴 THE SELF-FUNDING ROLL — puts pay for the call rolls

Source: 0x693LMgoB8 🟢 — his signature adjustment on a short strangle.

When the stock runs and the short call is threatened, he does not simply pay to roll it. He harvests the now-cheap short puts to finance it:

"I could increase the strike price from like 80 to 100 or 110, 120 on the puts, and those 5,000 contracts are going to fetch me a hell of a lot of premium that I can then use those credits to increase the strike price on the short callI could pay for those debits with the credits from the short put."

The seesaw: he deliberately runs unequal weights —

"I only got 2,000 contracts [calls] versus 5,000 contracts [puts]. That's why the weight of the short puts is a lot more than the weight of the short calls. It's like a seesaw."

The put side is oversized precisely so it can fund the call side's defense.

DEFENDThe goal of a roll must be stated before you do it

Source: IxkVqiRib1w 🟢

"Whenever you roll, you first have to formulate a goal. What's the goal? The goal is I want to capture $8 more of capital appreciation [rolling $12 → $20 strike] on 50 contracts, 5,000 shares — that's $40,000 in capital appreciation. But the amount that I have to pay to do that, it has to make sense."

DEFENDRolling "out and up," aiming to align expirations

"I want to move the goal post out and up, because eventually I want to match these expiration dates.… I'll roll that strike out and up again — from 220 to 240 or 250 — so that I can stay out of harm's way."

DEFEND"Kick the can" — a worked roll

Source: IsnBJjjE8DY 🟢

"I don't want to deal with this anymore, so I want to kick this can down the road another month. I went from a 125 strike to a 130 strike and collected an additional $26,000 in credit. So I collected 26, I collected 14, and the initial 23 — about $65,000 in premium. My thing is I don't have to do anything because there's a lot of time on the clock."

MANAGE3. Exit rules

SituationAction
75% of max profit reached AND >25% of time remainsClose it.
Little premium left to squeezeLet it expire worthless — don't pay to close, "you giving money back"
Thesis changedRoll / exit
Preferred entry point changedRoll to "renegotiate" and reposition

He credits the "let it expire instead of buying back for pennies" change with substantially improving his ROI (adopted ~1 yr before the video).

PPD — "Premium Per Day" is his optimization metric: maximize premium collected per day of capital-at-risk. But he will not chase PPD if it moves him "from a real good situation to a not so good situation."


ENTER3b. Covered call — entry mechanics

(Source: "Now let's talk COVERED CALLS!" — he calls it "flipping the script" on the put rules.)

ParameterSetting
Delta15–25 delta
Strike vs. 200-day MAIf stock is below the 200-day → sell the call above the 200-day
WhyThe 200-day "is going to act like a wall… resistance." Using it as protection means the call likely expires worthless — "we received and kept all of the premiums up front and you still have your shares."
If already above the 200-dayReference the 50-day instead
RSI~70 — wants it overbought (exact mirror of the 30–35 oversold put entry)
GoalAdequate compensation for putting shares up for sale while still qualifying for capital appreciation

DEFENDThe rolling trigger — where he breaks from consensus

"The ideal time to roll a covered call… it is when your break-even has been breached. [Another creator] says the ideal time to roll is when your strike has been breached — I beg to differ. … If you're still below your break-even there's no reason to roll, because you're still going to be at a net positive on that position if you're okay with assignment."

Rule: roll on break-even breach, not strike breach.


DEFEND4. When to take assignment (vs roll)

Rolling is optional, not the default reflex.

"So rolling out becomes totally optional vs a go-to move."

Take assignment when the adjusted cost basis is still net positive and the covered call he can write against the shares pays more than the roll would.

His RIOT example: break-even ~$820 after premium; stock at ~$810 → still net positive adjusted → take the shares, then sell $850 covered calls. If assigned 1,000 contracts at 850 and called away at 950 → "we just made a shitload of money — an extra 100 grand."
"You have to be very comfortable with owning shares if you want to make bigger money. If you just want to cash grab that's fine, but you're always going to be limited."

MANAGE3d. 🟡 ROI DISCIPLINE — how he decides to take profit early

Source: M3aInHdFalw 🟢. He computes return on collateral, not return on premium.

Worked META trade:

Sold5 cash-secured puts, $490 strike
Collateral tied up$245,000
Premium collected$1,290/contract = $6,450
After 1 weekup 80% (gave back $1,320)
Realized$6,450 − $1,320 ≈ $5,130
ROI on collateral2.6% in one week"annualized that's over 100%"

The decision rule:

"Holding out for 20% in a month is not worth it. I think we take ours — just look at the collateral. We always calculate the ROI."

→ Once most of the premium is captured quickly, free the collateral; the residual isn't worth the capital lockup or the tail risk.

Weekly benchmark he uses when screening: "that would be 1% a week, 1.2% a week" — roughly 1%+ per week on collateral is the bar for a new trade.


3k. ⚫ THE "BACK STOP TRADE" — his barbell, and his own coined term

Source: tfU3oFITz6Y 🟢. This is the structure that explains his weird long-dated positions (e.g. the PLTR $50 strike at 500 DTE seen on X in Feb 2026).

"Back Stop Trade is terminology that's only for this channel — it's not universal language. I call it the Back Stop Trade because I played baseball growing up. You essentially sold the cash-secured put in the distance, and it's an oversized trade, and you're doing it at a strike price where you don't even have to look at it because you want the shares — and they typically paid you about 20, 30, 40% annualized for doing so. And then you'd grab all of that premium and do short-dated stuff with that premium — so you're compounding your ROI that way."

The barbell:

LegCharacteristicsPurpose
Back stopDeep OTM · long-dated · oversized · genuinely wants assignmentPays 20–40% annualized, requires no management
FrontShort-dated, funded by the back stop's premiumCompounds ROI on the same capital

The back stop is deliberately set where he'd be happy to be assigned, so it needs no babysitting — which is exactly why he can say "I don't even have to look at it for a while."


DEFEND3l. 🟢 Covered call timing & the net-zero-credit roll floor

Source: tfU3oFITz6Y 🟢

"I'm going to wait for like a really good 5%, 10% day [to] sell some conservative covered calls, maybe out for two weeks — I'm not too far out in time, because if [PLTR] does keep going up another 5, 10, 20% after that, I want to have that flexibility to be able to roll it once, twice, three times if I have to, to make sure that I stay ahead of those shares."

Then the hard rule on roll cost:

"If I have to sacrifice premium for it — I'm not going to pay premium, but if I have to roll for a net credit of zero, then I'm willing to roll up in strike as high up as I can and kick it down the road a couple months."
Rule
When to sell CCsInto strength — a 5–10% up day
TenorShort (~2 weeks) — deliberately, to preserve roll optionality
Roll cost floorNet credit ≥ $0. Never pay a debit to roll.

Note this contradicts the "far-dated" instinct: he goes short-dated on calls precisely so he can keep rolling up and stay ahead of a runaway stock.


3m. 🔴 Put credit spreads — the collateral trap, and spread width

Source: yH8Hy2Xm-sA, pKbYvHNAIU4 🟢

DEFENDThe trap: people size spreads by premium, not by assignment capital

Worked TSLA example — short 210 / long 205, 5 contracts:

"Our 205 protects us from essentially needing $21,000 in capital. Mind you this is five positions, so I have to make a mental note that says I've got to have essentially $100,000 ready to go for Tesla at any moment. And I think that's where people really drop the ball with put credit spreads — they get lost in the sauce just by looking at 'hey, I can make a lot of premium.'"

The margin death-spiral he's personally hit

"I had sold put spreads on ENPH — the first strike was 110 and then 105 — and I couldn't roll it because I lost so much that I didn't have the margin to continue."

→ A spread that moves against you can strand you: no margin left to roll. This is the failure mode a plain CSP doesn't have.

Spread width — he prefers WIDE

"The wider the spread — you want to give those deltas enough room to move.… When you have a five-wide spread, these deltas are just offsetting each other, you're almost forced to go the direction of the contract, and you're going to be in there forever. Even with a 15–20 wide you can still just roll the whole vertical — you don't have to break it down."

⚠️ Note this conflicts with the ⅓-width guest rule in §3i, which assumed $5-wide. TJ's own preference is 15–20 wide.


MANAGE3f. 🟡 PPD — "Premium Per Day", the early-close decision rule

Source: sRGZ3yaWVaU 🟢 — this is the actual math behind closing early.

"When you close out trades early it comes down to PPD — premium per day. Let's say I got $100 in premium for a cash-secured put and it's a 30-day trade, but in 10 days I'm already at $60 profit — I'm at 60%. Might be time to close it out, because I could find another trade that will yield me more premium per day for the remaining 20 days of that contract. A good rule of thumb that I use is about 75% — once I'm at 75% profit I usually [close]."

The arithmetic:

Original trade$100 ÷ 30 days = $3.33/day expected
After 10 days, $60 captured$6.00/day actually realized
Remaining$40 ÷ 20 days = $2.00/day
DecisionIf a new trade beats $2.00/day, close and redeploy

The question is never "am I up?" — it's "is the remaining premium per day still the best use of this collateral?"


DEFEND3g. 🟢 Delta = probability of assignment, and reading skew

Source: oBKAA2SyotY, 0x693LMgoB8 🟢

"The real easy way to look at delta is what is your percentage of assignment.… You can look at 15 [delta] as the percentage that it would actually expire in the money."

So a 15-delta short option ≈ 15% chance of assignment; 30-delta ≈ 30%. This is why his delta choices map directly onto his intent:

DeltaAssignment oddsWhen he uses it
15–2515–25%Strangles/straddles, "feeling out" · covered calls
2020%Cash-grab puts — doesn't want the shares
30–4030–40%Wants the shares / very bullish

Reading skew in seconds

"$400 south is where our strike price is, and that's a two delta. We went $400 north… that's a 17 delta. We're talking equidistant.… That is just a real quick way to know which way the tide is leaning. This has positive call skew."

Method: price the call and put equidistant from spot. Whichever side carries the higher delta is where the market expects movement — and where you're being paid more to take risk.


3h. ⚫ Disclosed returns — the scale he claims

Source: oBKAA2SyotY 🟢, computed live on stream:

"We're utilizing $715,000 in cash to generate $521,000 in premiums over the course of 121 days."73% in 121 days ≈ 421% annualized. "This is a game of math, guys."

⚠️ Treat as a self-reported, un-audited figure on a favorable window. It also implies leverage/margin, not a cash-secured book.


3i. 🔴 Put credit spreads — the ⅓-width premium rule

Source: sYmKem77Z3A⚠️ likely a GUEST speaking, see §4b. The clip reads "I know you like to do the same… you use spreads a little differently so you don't follow that particular rule" — i.e. TJ does NOT follow this. Recorded because it's a clean rule and useful context, not because it's his.

"On big companies, $5-wide [spreads]… if it's a $5-wide spread then that'd roughly be like 1.6 or 1.7 you would want to collect in premium… take one third of that distance and that should be how much you're collecting. Anywhere from 25 to 33% of the width of your strikes."

Rationale: "if that spread goes against you, you want to have collected a sufficient enough amount of premium to help you start rolling down or closing out for a smaller loss. If you just collected pennies because you never thought it would breach your strike — and it does — then it breached your strike for no good reason."


DEFEND3j. 🟢 Rights vs. obligations — the assignment mindset

Source: sRGZ3yaWVaU 🟢

"Whenever you're the one paying the premium and you're the buyer, you have the RIGHT. The seller has the OBLIGATION.… Some people get all freaked out, 'oh my God, I was assigned' — whoa, no, you're kind of obligated to do so."

Assignment is the contract working as designed, not a failure state. He enters every short put "right and ready to take assignment — that's just the way that I trade the wheel."

An honest caveat he volunteers:

"At the end of the day you're going to make a lot more money just holding the stock long term, and it's less stressful as well."

ENTER3e. 🟢 Covered call strike vs. adjusted cost basis — the hard floor

Source: WHwKUHMvfgA 🟢

"You sell the covered call with the strike price above your $89 cost basisIf you pick a strike price for the covered call below your cost basis, you could be forced to sell at a loss if you don't roll."

Adjusted cost basis = share price paid − all premium collected. Worked example:

"Keep track of your cost basis. You will collect a lot of options premiums, therefore you should keep track of all the premiums you collect and subtract them from your cost basis."

Never write a call below adjusted basis unless you're prepared to roll forever.

He also notes the wheel works on ETFs (e.g. SPY) if you don't want single-name risk.


3n. 🟡 The covered call's real cost — "not qualified for the reindeer games"

Source: MzT06agA6KE 🟢. His plainest statement of covered-call opportunity cost.

"[Above the strike] the party stops right there at eight bucks. We are not qualified to participate in any more of the reindeer games. Anything above eight bucks, we are not qualified to make any of that money. The good news is those premiums — the $49,800 and the $69,000 — they will help offset that."

The remedy is the roll, priced explicitly in capital-appreciation terms:

"What are my options? I can roll the covered calls out a month… go from $8 to maybe $9 and qualify for another dollar in capital appreciation — and on 60,000 shares that would be another $60,000. That would be a gimme."

The roll is valued as: (strike increase) × (shares) = capital appreciation unlocked — then compared against the debit required. Same logic as §2c.


3c. Covered call DEFENSE — "my shares aren't for sale"

Source: Are Your COVERED CALLS in Danger? WATCH THIS! (39:30, w9CimJxLD80) 🟢

The governing principle behind every covered-call decision:

"What I'm always thinking is my shares aren't actually for sale, first and foremost. I have to put them up for sale contractually if I want to collect premium — and I'm long these stocks. What that means is I don't have a plan to sell some of these stocks for the next three to five [years]."

So the covered call is a rent-collection device on shares he never intends to deliver. Every defensive move follows from that.

DEFENDHe will roll out a FULL YEAR rather than lose shares

Worked example he gives on a 5,000-share position:

"I essentially rolled it an entire year because I wanted to go from a $10 strike to a $12 strike, because I was going to be right about a double… If I had known I was going to get 100% return on those shares when I first bought them, I'd have signed up for it all day long — and it was going to take less than two years. You're doubling a portion of your portfolio in two years."

Read alongside §3b: he rolls when break-even is breached, and he will pay for that roll in time (up to a year) rather than in shares.

ENTERRolling an ITM covered call — how far out?

There is no fixed answer; it is situational:

"It really depends on what is going on with the underlying. You have to be familiar with your stock — is there a catalyst, is there a binary event…"

DEFEND4b. ⚠️ ATTRIBUTION WARNING — the "WHEELERS" videos are panels

Several channel videos titled "WHEELERS ..." (How WHEELERS Deal With PUTS, WHEELERS Talk All Things COVERED CALLS, etc.) are roundtables with guests. Rules spoken in those videos are frequently someone else's, not TJ's.

Example — in How WHEELERS Deal With PUTS! a guest states his own params: 30–40 DTE · 0.10–0.30 delta · 1.5–2% return on capital · avoids assignment entirely · sells CSPs on margin · rolls up-and-out on covered calls and down-and-out on cash-secured puts.

That is not TJ. But the same clip gives a real TJ datapoint by contrast:

Guest: "I know TJ you use higher, probably closer to three or four percent"

TJ targets roughly 3–4% return on capital per ~30-day cycle, versus the guest's 1.5–2%. Consistent with his higher 20–40 delta vs the guest's 10–30.

Other guest frameworks captured (useful, but NOT TJ's)

Guest AHow WHEELERS Deal With PUTS (Fu9NbYlIUwk):

"I like to use 30 to 40 days out, 0.1 to 0.3 delta, and ideally 1.5 to 2% return on capital. I like to use 30 as close as I can to 30 days because it makes it an easy calculation for the percent return — 1% on the month, I know that's 12% for the year." "I avoid assignment on either side at all costs… I'm just going to roll up and out on my covered calls and roll down and out on my cash-secured puts as soon as the extrinsic value is at 10 cents, 15 cents or less — that's when I'll start kicking the can down the road, maybe 14 days out."

Guest BWHEELERS Talk All Things COVERED CALLS (7CFhDVSRQHQ):

"My rule for selling calls is at or above my ORIGINAL cost basis where I bought the shares — not my adjusted cost basis — and I need to get that 30% or greater [annualized] return as well. If I can check those boxes I'll sell the call and I'm happy with the outcome if it gets assigned. Even if the shares are break-even it's still a successful trade, because I guaranteed a 30% return — that was the rule going into selling the premium." "I try to sell as far out of the money as I can while still getting that 30% return, and if I have the opportunity to roll out and up for another 30% annualized credit, I'll do it. That's so much easier with the LEAPS — it's easier to get a 30% return on premium for a $250 stock when your investment is only $4,000."

⚠️ Guest B's "original, not adjusted, cost basis" rule directly contradicts TJ's §3e, which uses the adjusted basis as the floor. Guest B is stricter. Don't blend them.

When reading this SOP: rules tagged 🟢 are TJ speaking in his own videos. Anything in this section is a guest and is labelled as such.


4c. Additional rules from X (Jan–Feb 2026)

Position scale disclosed (Jan 2026)

LegCostP/L OpenQtyExpiryDTEStrike
AMZN C111,600−6,000−1,200Feb 2725d285 C
AMZN P313,000+23,400−200Sep 18228d220 P
AMZN P247,320+33,320−200Nov 20291d200 P

PORTFOLIO5. Portfolio construction (from his X posts, 2026)

"I used to be soooo enamored with avg cost of shares. Now I'm way more concerned with total share counts. In 2032, the price today won't matter."
"I'm a huge fan of See Profit, Take Profit. I use premiums to satisfy that itch." — i.e. premium income replaces selling shares.

EVIDENCE6. Vocabulary decoder

TermMeaning
Cash grabShort put/call sold purely for premium; assignment unwanted
North StarHis $100M portfolio goal
Roster spotOne of ~8 slots in the concentrated portfolio
Share goalTarget share count for a name
Ladder / rungsStaggered strikes & expiries on one underlying
PPDPremium Per Day — his efficiency metric
BPRBuying power reduction (margin cost of the short option)
Completion OrderA rung intended to finish building a position
25/25/50 · rule of 500His staged-entry position sizing scheme

EVIDENCE7. The full curriculum on his channel (for deeper reading)

VideoLengthID
CASH SECURED PUTS 101!32:56YHaoqE4Eu48
Now let's talk COVERED CALLS!18:13WxuMkA6neGI
How I'm Fixing My COVERED CALLS!52:54IxkVqiRib1w
Are Your COVERED CALLS in Danger? WATCH THIS!39:30w9CimJxLD80
How WHEELERS Deal With PUTS!30:16Fu9NbYlIUwk
Will Your Shares be Put on YOU?30:48IsnBJjjE8DY
Don't Understand PUT CREDIT SPREADS? Watch This!25:12sYmKem77Z3A
WHEELERS Talk All Things COVERED CALLS17:107CFhDVSRQHQ
INTRO TO THE WHEEL DEAL OPTION'S TRACKER!!25:52aStN9MVJNSY
Let's talk Covered Strangle!7:13B3dZOGdxP0M
The Wheel Deal's guide to the Triple Income Wheel Strategy!15:00
The Wheel Deal Strategy In 3 mins!!3:00

Watch at youtube.com/watch?v=&lt;ID&gt;.


7b. Covered-call defense — "my shares aren't for sale"

From Are Your COVERED CALLS in Danger? (w9CimJxLD80, TJ speaking):

"What I'm always thinking is my shares aren't actually for sale, first and foremost. I have to put them up for sale [to collect the premium]…"

This is the mental model behind the whole covered-call side: the call is a rental fee, not an intent to sell. Consequences:

"If I'd known I was going to get a 100% return on those shares when I first bought them, I'd have signed up for it all day long… you're doubling a portion of your portfolio in two years."

8. Video coverage status (as of this session)

VideoIDStatus
CASH SECURED PUTS 101!YHaoqE4Eu48✅ read (partial, ~30%)
Now let's talk COVERED CALLS!WxuMkA6neGI✅ read (partial)
How WHEELERS Deal With PUTS!Fu9NbYlIUwk✅ read — ⚠️ panel, guest rules
Are Your COVERED CALLS in Danger?w9CimJxLD80✅ read (partial) — interview w/ Amit
Triple Income Wheel StrategysRGZ3yaWVaUno captions available
The Wheel Deal Strategy In 3 minscyCkiBmWUcs⬜ not yet
Will Your Shares be Put on YOU?IsnBJjjE8DY⬜ not yet
How I'm Fixing My COVERED CALLS!IxkVqiRib1w⬜ not yet
Don't Understand PUT CREDIT SPREADS?sYmKem77Z3A⬜ not yet
Rolling Put Credit SpreadsoFMdh_rG9zo⬜ not yet
Let's talk Covered Strangle!B3dZOGdxP0M⬜ not yet
Tax HarvestingmzVXhsp780U⬜ not yet
WHEEL DEAL OPTION'S TRACKERaStN9MVJNSY⬜ not yet
How to update the Wheel TrackerQS86tcauuKg⬜ not yet
WHEELERS Talk COVERED CALLS7CFhDVSRQHQ⬜ not yet — panel

EVIDENCE8b. Method note — how to pull more transcripts

YouTube's caption endpoint returns empty without a signed token, and DOMParser is blocked by Trusted Types. Working recipe (verified):

  1. Navigate to youtube.com/watch?v=&lt;ID&gt;
  2. Click #expand to open the description
  3. Click the button whose aria-label matches "Show transcript"
  4. Click the play button with a REAL mouse click (computer:left_click at the player's play control, ~(31, 646) at 1541×784). This is the critical step — video.play() from JS is autoplay-blocked, the video never starts, and the transcript panel hangs on a spinner forever. A synthetic play() will NOT work.
  5. Wait ~8s → segments appear
  6. Extract with a selector that handles both renders YouTube A/B tests: ytd-transcript-segment-renderer, transcript-segment-view-model and read inner text from span.ytAttributedStringHost, .segment-text (falling back to innerText.split('\n').slice(2) to drop the timestamp lines)

Notes:


🔍 AUDIT — an independent read on this strategy

My assessment, not his. Read before copying anything above.

What's genuinely good about it

StrengthWhy it holds up
Mechanical, not discretionaryFixed DTE, delta, profit target and roll triggers. Removes most in-the-moment judgment — the main destroyer of retail returns
Pre-committed entry AND exit"You need an entry strategy and an exit strategy on day one" — prevents thesis drift after the trade moves
The 50%-drawdown testGenuinely excellent filter. Kills most bad positions before they start
Reserved capital (25/25/50)Half the powder held for the deepest level. Most retail averages down until it's out of money
Break-even, not strike, as the roll triggerCorrect and underrated. Strike breach alone is not a loss
Sizing rule learned from failureHe tried 1%/day theta, it broke, he cut to 0.75%. Rare to see a public trader publish the number that hurt them
Assignment reframed as normal"You're obligated to do so" — removes the panic that makes people close good positions at the worst time
PPD (premium per day)A real opportunity-cost framework. Better than "am I up?"
Cost-basis disciplineEvery premium dollar tracked against basis. Honest accounting of where the return actually comes from

What concerns me

RiskThe problem
🚨 Portfolio margin is doing the heavy lifting"$128,000 versus $1.6 million" for the same trade — ~12× leverage. His returns are not reproducible in a cash account. Anyone copying this in cash sees a fraction of the numbers
🚨 "Roll till I'm right" can mask a loss indefinitelyA position rolled to 2030 is never marked as a loser. It's "$120 grand in the hole from rolling" on one position and still framed as an open campaign, not a loss
🚨 Short naked calls = theoretically unlimited riskHe sells naked calls as a "downside hedge." That is not a hedge — it's an uncapped short. One gap up on a MSTR/PLTR-type name is the tail that ends accounts
🚨 Concentration~8 roster spots, heavily in high-beta/crypto-adjacent names (MSTR, PLTR, HOOD, RIOT, CLSK, BMNR). These correlate hard in a drawdown — exactly when BP compresses
Survivorship in the sample2023–2026 was an extraordinary bull run for these names. The strategy hasn't been publicly stress-tested through a sustained bear
Vega/vanna is the real exposureHe names it himself. Short premium + leverage + a VIX spike = BP compression precisely when you need BP to roll
Selection bias in what's postedWins get whiteboards. The ENPH spread loss and the OTLY wheel get one-line mentions. Assume worse outcomes exist off-camera
Conflicts of interesttastytrade referral link + paid community + YouTube revenue. He is compensated for activity and for appearing successful
Unaudited numbers"421% annualized" is self-reported on a chosen window. Treat all figures as marketing until proven otherwise
Rule inconsistencies50% vs 70–75% profit target · 30–45 vs 45–60 DTE · short-dated vs far-dated calls. The system is looser in practice than it sounds

Things to consider before copying any of it

  1. Cash vs margin changes everything. Run his exact trades in a cash account and the returns collapse. Decide which game you're playing before you copy a number.
  2. Naked calls are the line. Everything else here is defensible. Uncapped short calls on high-beta names is a different risk class — you can lose more than the account.
  3. The strategy needs a bull or flat market. It monetizes time and range. In a sustained decline you get assigned everywhere at once, on correlated names, with compressed BP.
  4. The 0.75% theta cap is the one rule to not negotiate. It's the only thing standing between this and a margin call.
  5. "Roll forever" requires the roll to stay free. If a roll costs a debit and you pay it anyway, you've converted a premium strategy into a directional bet.
  6. Track realized P&L separately from premium collected. Premium collected is not profit if the shares are underwater.
  7. His edge may be size, not method. 5,000-contract positions get fills, flexibility and BP treatment retail doesn't.

Bottom line

The decision framework is genuinely strong — the entry gates, sizing tranches, break-even roll trigger and PPD math are worth adopting regardless of what you trade. The risk posture is aggressive — leverage, concentration and naked calls on volatile names. Those are separable. You can run his process at a fraction of his risk, and that's probably the right way to use this document.


PART II — EVIDENCE & POSITION RECORD (what he actually posted)

Account

Profile detail

EVIDENCEFEASIBILITY CONSTRAINT (read first)

A complete trade-by-trade ledger (date/ticker/entry/size/exit/P&L) cannot be reconstructed from his X text posts. Reasons:

  1. He does not post structured trade alerts. Trade info appears as narrative asides in replies ("I got assigned 5k shares at $9").
  2. His actual detailed trade logs ARE published — but as rendered images (daily recap documents, footer reads "verified to the raw CSV to the penny"). These must be opened and read visually, one at a time. 3,747 media items.
  3. His portfolio walkthroughs are livestreams/broadcasts, not text.

DEFENDDeep-scroll test result (2026-08-16) — CORRECTION to earlier note

Earlier I recorded that history was capped at 2026-07-31. That was wrong — it was a limit of search, not of the timeline. Tested properly:

DEFENDBetter paths than brute-force scrolling

  1. His YouTube channel — long-form strategy explanation, transcripts are plain text and far easier to mine for the SOP than 29K tweets.
  2. WHEELERS: PREMIUM JUNKIES community — purpose-built for trade screenshots.
  3. Capture forward, not backward — scrape his daily recap image each day from here on; builds a clean ledger going forward at ~1 image/day.
  4. X API / archive export — the only realistic route to bulk history.

Rate limit (measured, not assumed)

PORTFOLIOCURRENT PORTFOLIO (broker screenshot, ~2026-08-12)

Columns appear to be: last price / day P&L / total P&L

TickerPriceDay P&LTotal P&L
BMNR18.08-52,500.00-456,369.00
TSLA330.89+8,575.00+19,531.05
SOFI18.10-2,500.00-220,756.58
MSTR97.32-7,000.00+325,053.37
PLTR175.23+114,299.10+1,375,701.41
CLSK11.60-26,000.00-17,672.00
HOOD94.51+5,155.00+5,155.00

Position / size statements (from text posts, dated)

EVIDENCE2026 TIMELINE (Jan–Aug 2026, via dated X search slices)

Method that worked: from:TJTheWheelDeal since:YYYY-MM-DD until:YYYY-MM-DD — each slice loads fresh at the top, sidestepping the deep-scroll freeze problem entirely. 105 posts captured across the year.

DateTicker(s)What he said
2026-02-01BTC"BITCOIN IS ON SALE!!" — put "toys" on notice (may sell possessions to buy)
2026-02-01BTC"Almost at 10% of a whole $BTC using mostly YouTube and X earnings"
2026-02-02BMNR"Am I willing to DOUBLE DOWN ON $BMNR? MAYBE!!"
2026-02-02PYPL"wants to welcome the high beta names to the PAIN ZONE!!"
2026-02-02On a losing put: "Yes and then increase contracts to offset"
2026-02-02"I use the big one as the lab rat. I'll be rolling those to $50"
2026-02-02PLTR"My PLTR puts are now at $50, 500 days out. I don't even have to look at it for a while"
2026-02-02"As long as buying power is holding up… If buying power gets compromised, I'll have to trim or roll some short puts"
2026-03-02MSTR"I sold 700 puts at $100"
2026-03-02MSTR"If he buys tomorrow, I'll pick up another 10k shares just cuz"
2026-04-02"put those naked calls in the WIN COLUMN… won't really have to babysit the short puts"
2026-05-02MSTR"MANUFACTURE THE WIN if it's a campaign and not just another trade." Wants to buy LEAPS funded with short-call premiums to participate to upside; thinks it sees $400
2026-05-02DTE answer: "45 to 60 days." (Video said 30–45 — this is an evolution)
2026-06-01SOFI → MU"Closed $SOFI leaps for modest gain… moved the $ over to $MU. Rest of position rides to $100B MINIMUM. I'll rinse and repeat on the short puts and won't sell covered calls unless we make it past $22"
2026-06-01MU"BOUGHT 1000 SHARES OF $MU WITH OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY!!" (i.e. premium)
2026-06-02MSTR"Is $MSTR thesis broken?? Mr. Never-sell-your-Bitcoin sold some Bitcoin."
2026-07-02"It feels nice to be up on the 5k shares, but that's about it lol"
2026-07-02MU"This is what happens when I buy a stock!! $MU bulls were acting cocky…"
2026-07-31"Selling premiums consistently creates cash flow. Cash flow is like oxygen. It creates optionality for your account. Stop complaining about not having dip money if you're not willing to sell puts and calls."

2026 behaviors worth noting

📓 TRADE JOURNAL — reconstructed from his own on-air numbers

Every row below is him stating the numbers himself on video. These are not complete trade records — he rarely gives entry date, exit date and final P&L for the same trade in one place. Undated rows are marked .

Closed / realized trades

TickerStructureSizeCollateralPremium inGiven backRealizedDurationSource
METACash-secured puts5 × $490$245,000$6,450$1,320≈$5,130 (2.6% on collateral)~1 weekJoMVUZoggA4 M3aInHdFalw
HOODCash-secured puts50 × $20$3,000$900$2,100~1 month (Jun 18→19)M3aInHdFalw
MSTXWheel campaign100 contracts$1,690,000$174,999≈$99,150 captured8ToSeTuo0Ic
HOODCovered strangle300 sh @ $132 + $140C$1,155 (call)shares −$1,600 at the timeJoMVUZoggA4
CSP, "10 min of homework"1,100 sh equiv$110,000$2,250shortJoMVUZoggA4
Rolled CC $9 → $156,000 shares−$2,823 (debit)bought $6 × 6,000 = $36,000 of capital appreciationm9SPRYpsFFs
Shares sold at $7020,000 shares$188,000 (avg cost ~$57.53)nF56RPgO4RA EjzcFVeHjNQ

Open positions he walked through on camera

TickerLegSizeStrikeDTEPremiumNotes
PLTRShort puts2,000$50501$3.10 → $620,000= agreement to buy 200,000 shares. Basis → $46.90
PLTRShort calls (naked)700$20047$1.70 → $119,000Lowers basis further. "Rich man's covered call"
PLTRShort puts350$16019 delta · extrinsic $183,750
PLTRShort calls700$26012 delta · extrinsic $177,800 · 70,000 sh
MSTRShort strangle800+225–400 zone53targeting +$200–400k on next rollNeeds to stay in range; he gives it 75% odds
MSTRNotional200,000 sh$11053$22,000,000 notional
PayPalShort puts$60 / $5019 / 383Portfolio margin: $128k tied up vs $1.6M
Shares + CC + CSP60,000 sh @ $6.36600 × $8C (12/19) · 600 × $7P (1/16)$49,800 + $69,000Likely a sub-$10 name
LEAPS + CCs100 leaps + 100 CC @ $70"willing to lose $10–20k so my leaps run free"

🔴 Losses and mistakes he admits on camera

WhatDetailSource
Covered call campaign underwaterCollected $65,000 total; would cost $188,000 to close. "I'm in the hole about $120 grand from rolling — I've had to roll this position three times already because it's really gotten away from me"IsnBJjjE8DY
ENPH put spreadsStrikes 110 / 105. "I couldn't roll it because I lost so much that I didn't have the margin to continue"yH8Hy2Xm-sA
OTLY (Oatly) wheel"I wheeled it — I don't know what I was thinking"WHwKUHMvfgA
1% theta sizing rule"That rule did not work. And they told me it wasn't going to work and I didn't believe them"0x693LMgoB8
Bought back calls at a loss"I ended up just biting the bullet… I've been scaling back so much"IxkVqiRib1w
$125,000 left on the table"I accept the fact that I left $125,000 on the table" (shares called away)IxkVqiRib1w
Sold too early / capped upsidePLTR S&P inclusion: "I would have closed them out… now I'm rolling them, I had to roll them out a couple months"IxkVqiRib1w

⚠️ What is still missing from this journal


EVIDENCESample daily recap log (image, ~2026-08-11) — the format that HAS real detail

TimeTickerActionDetailP&L
1:15 & 1:18RIOTSELLDeepened the cash-grab ladder — 250 Jan $12 puts + 400 Mar $10 puts for $55,899+$555,698.67
3:35 PMHOODROLLRolled the cash-grab UP — bought back 250 $60 puts, sold 250 $75 puts for $93,926+$593,925.75
9:08 & 10:22MUROLLRolled the Completion Order up twice — $750 → $790 → $800 puts x30+$95,030.80
10:18 AMENPHBUYBought 2,000 shares at $40.49 — ENPH to 35,000-$80,981.60
12:00 PMENPHROLLRestructured the call ladder — closed the Aug 45s, sold new 50/55/60 rungs+$535,330.16
NETverified to the raw CSV to the penny-$192,812.31

Also visible: ENPH shares 35,000 · MU Completion Order $750 (3 leg) · cash balance $1,876,255

STRATEGY / SOP — direct quotes gathered so far

Terminology decoder

Open questions / not yet established