TRADER DOSSIER: TJ "The Wheel Deal"

Not financial advice. This documents what one public trader says he does. He is compensated via referral links and a paid community, posts wins more visibly than losses, and none of his figures are audited. Verify everything before risking capital.

📑 Contents

Confidence tags used throughout: 🟢 = TJ speaking in his own video · 🟡 = TJ on X in his own words · 🔴 = panel/guest video, may not be TJ, or unverified claim.

🎯 The Strategy in Plain English

TJ runs the wheel, scaled up on portfolio margin. He picks a small roster of stocks he genuinely wants to own for years (PLTR, SOFI, MSTR, RIOT, CLSK, HOOD…), sells cash-secured puts on them to get paid while waiting to buy, takes assignment happily, then sells covered calls against the shares, and treats the premium from both sides as a cash-flow engine that buys more shares. His words: "It's not about owning stock. It's about knowing how to make money off that stock."

Two things separate him from a textbook wheel trader. First, scale and leverage: portfolio margin lets him put on the same position for ~1/12th of the cash collateral, and he runs thousands of contracts and eight-figure notional. Second, he never intends to deliver his core shares. When a short call or put goes wrong he doesn't take the loss, he rolls, indefinitely ("I'm going to roll right until I'm right… till 2030, 2035 if necessary"), funds call-side repairs with put-side premium, and measures success by total share count on the way to a stated "$100M North Star."

The engine's fuel is theta; the governor is buying power, not stop-losses. His one hard risk number, learned by blowing through it, is to keep daily theta at or below 0.75% of net liquidation value. Everything else in the plan below hangs off those bones.

⚡ THE TRADING PLAN

The plan at a glance: master table

P1. Instrument & market

Single-stock options on a concentrated, high-beta, crypto-adjacent roster. Both sides of the chain simultaneously: short puts below, short calls above, often deliberately unbalanced (see D3, "the seesaw"). Shares accumulate in the middle and are treated as permanent. LEAPS appear occasionally, both long (funded by short-call premium) and, his signature, short (D2, "rich man's covered call").

SELECTP2. Selection: which tickers qualify

Three gates, in order, all 🟢:

1. The 50%-drawdown test. "Before you get into a position, ask yourself, are you going to like it if it's a 50% drawdown? Are you still going to be excited to really scoop up more? If the answer is no, then maybe you don't need to be trying to get into it, period, because you only like it if it goes up." This is the entry gate everything else assumes.
2. The honest bucket. Every ticker is categorized before the trade: investment ("willing to rock with this thing through thick and thin for 3–5 years", wants assignment, builds share count) or cash grab (premium only, assignment unwanted). "If you are willing to be honest with yourself and properly categorize each ticker you are set up… to manufacture the win." His synonym pair on X: "campaign vs trade."
3. The 100-share commitment. "It's got to be 100 shares worth… you've got to commit to 100. A $100 stock is a $10,000 investment right off the jump, so let me take a serious look at whether I even think they have a moat."

He also weighs market sentiment at entry ("if the market hates a stock, they will continue to hate a stock") and requires an entry and exit thesis on day one: "This isn't 'I'm going to play it as it goes based on the price action.'"

ENTERP3. Entry mechanics: the numbers

Cash-secured put (the wheel's first leg), all 🟢 from CASH SECURED PUTS 101:

Covered call (after assignment), 🟢 from Now let's talk COVERED CALLS: delta 15–25; strike above the 200-day MA ("it's going to act like a wall… resistance"); RSI ~70 (overbought, sell into a 5–10% up-day); tenor kept short (~2 weeks) on runners to preserve roll flexibility; strike must clear adjusted cost basis (= price paid − all premium collected): "If you pick a strike below your cost basis, you could be forced to sell at a loss."

Return bar: ~3–4% per cycle on capital (stated by a guest, confirmed by contrast, see D10) and roughly 1%+/week on collateral when screening ("that would be 1% a week, 1.2% a week"). Cash-grab annualized target: ~30%.

PORTFOLIOP4. Position sizing & capital

• 25/25/50 tranches 🟢: "It's 25% of the total capital I'd like to allocate. If it dips, we deploy the other 25%. And if it really dips, I deploy the rest, the 50% that's left." Each rung priced ~10% below the last ("the rule of 500" example: puts at $10 → $7 → heavy at $5). Half the capital is reserved for the deepest level, he buys heaviest into weakness.
• Stay-deployed doctrine 🟡: premiums are recycled into shares ("BOUGHT 1000 SHARES OF $MU WITH OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY"), building toward per-name share goals (RIOT/CLSK 150k, PLTR 35k, SOFI 100k+) on ~8 roster spots competing for the $100M North Star.
• The one hard cap, 0.75% theta 🟢, his most expensive lesson: "We got a $10 million account, I want to collect $100,000 a day in premium and theta. That rule did not work. Dr. Jim Schultz says the rule is 0.5% and that's on the high end. We landed in the middle. I'm at 0.75. If you're exceeding 0.75% of your net liquidation value on your theta per day, you're supersized… it's just a matter of time before the vega is going to bite you in the ass."

MANAGEP5. Managing the winner: profit rules

DEFENDP6. Defending the trade: when it goes against you

The consolidated doctrine (full quotes and worked rolls in D3–D4):

Test adjustments on the biggest position first, 🟡 "I use the big one as the lab rat."

DEFENDP7. Risk controls, leverage & buying power

• Leverage is the context for every number he quotes 🟢: "On tastytrade, because we have portfolio margin… you're only tying up $128,000 versus $1.6 [million]." ≈12× capital efficiency. He also sells "cash-secured" puts on margin, the term is loose. A cash account running identical trades sees a fraction of his ROI.
• The rule of 15% 🟢: tastytrade stress-tests the book at ±15% ("Palantir has done that before, in both directions, unfortunately"). Size so a 15% gap isn't an account event; VIX spikes cut buying power exactly when you're hurt ("volatility goes up, buying power goes down").
• No stop-losses anywhere. Defense is rolling + sizing + the theta cap. The known blow-up mode: a position too big to roll (his ENPH spreads, "I couldn't roll it because I lost so much that I didn't have the margin," Evidence §E4).
• Naked calls carry uncapped risk; he frames them as a "hedge to the downside" (D2), see Audit.

P8. Worked example: one PLTR campaign, his real numbers

His live "rich man's covered call" calendar (🟢 KDC0WNX0RUY):

1. Sell 2,000 puts, $50 strike, 501 DTE → $3.10 each = $620,000 premium collected up front. This is an agreement to buy 200,000 PLTR at $50, shares he wants ("Dude, give me those shares, Mr. Market").
2. Effective basis if assigned: $50 − $3.10 = $46.90.
3. Sell 700 naked calls, $200 strike, 47 DTE → $1.70 = $119,000 more. Adjusted basis math he walks: $10M → ~$8.38M for the block.
4. Weekly/monthly: manage each leg at 21 DTE, capture 60–75%, roll the short calls up-and-out on strength, "eventually I want to match these expiration dates", rolling 220 → 240/250 as PLTR climbs.
5. If PLTR spikes: puts go nearly worthless → roll them up ($80 → $110/120), harvest fresh credit, pay the call-side roll with it. If it dumps: he's collecting toward owning 200k shares at a discount he already priced.
6. Exit: there isn't one. "Roll right until I'm right, till 2030, 2035 if necessary."

P9. Scenario quick-reference

📖 DEEP DIVE: the doctrine, one rule at a time

Everything below expands the plan with his own words. Each fact appears once; the plan tables above are the numbers, this is the why.

D1. Philosophy & mental models

• The channel taglines 🟢: "Sell puts, sell calls, collect premium, roll when it makes dollars and cents." And: "It's not about an allegiance to a certain company… it's about can you make money with that ticker, and how can you mirror the deltas? When you own a share, it's one delta." Shares are just delta-1; options synthesize, hedge, or rent that delta.
• Cash flow as oxygen 🟡 (2026-07-31): "Selling premiums consistently creates cash flow. Cash flow is like oxygen. It creates optionality for your account. Stop complaining about not having dip money if you're not willing to sell puts and calls. You're a buy, hold and hoper, and that's ok too. Run your own race."
• The three spokes of the wheel 🟢: "The cash-secured put premium, the covered call premium, and the capital appreciation." Skipping the third spoke makes you "not a Wheeler, you're a cash-secured put seller… your upside is only the premium." "The biggest alpha is always going to be in owning the shares and writing those up… the market trends up; there's 150 years of historical data."
• Rights vs obligations 🟢: "The buyer has the RIGHT. The seller has the OBLIGATION… Some people get freaked out, 'oh my God, I was assigned', no, you're kind of obligated to do so." Assignment is the contract working. He enters every put "right and ready to take assignment." His honest caveat: "At the end of the day you're going to make a lot more money just holding the stock long term, and it's less stressful as well."
• Simplicity doctrine 🟢: "There's only four things you can do with options: buy calls, buy puts, sell calls, sell puts. Everything else is a combination… That's why I never use things like verticals, diagonals, calendars, you lose 90% of the audience." (He trades the structures; he refuses the vocabulary.)
• Poker framing 🟢: mistakes are play errors, not the CEO's fault, "it's how you played the hand… you could have folded it." Paired with Buffett's "risk comes from not knowing what you're doing."
• On complainers 🟡: "A lot of you watch a position get into trouble and just whine and complain. Take action and make the best [of it]."

D2. His structure #1: the "Rich Man's Covered Call"

His own coinage 🟢 (KDC0WNX0RUY). The standard poor man's covered call buys a LEAP and sells short calls against it, you pay to open. His inversion sells the LEAP:

"Whenever you buy a LEAP and start selling calls on top, that's the poor man's covered call. I am calling this the RICH MAN'S covered call, you SELL the LEAP at a strike price and you're like, 'Dude, give me those shares, Mr. Market.'"

Why naked calls sit on top: "Those naked calls are essentially a hedge to the downside. In my mind it's almost like buying puts, except I want to COLLECT premium. I don't ever want to pay premium, because I am a premium collector." Why he claims it beats the PMCC: "You're collecting theta the whole way through… you're a NET PREMIUM SELLER versus having to pay premium by buying the LEAP."

Every premium dollar lowers the effective purchase price of shares he intends to own, a financed accumulation vehicle, not a directional trade. (The "hedge" framing is challenged in the Audit: a short call caps nothing on the downside and is uncapped on the upside.)

D3. His structure #2: the strangle: goalposts, seesaw, self-funding

• The goalpost 🟢: the short put + short call pair. "The wider the goalpost, the less the adjustments, the less the credits." Width is the whole tradeoff, he drifts wider as size grows because at his size, adjustments are the real cost.
• A position's real life 🟢: "First roll, second roll, third roll, fourth roll, fifth roll, before you know it… the ball just got to stay in the air and I'm good. My expiration date is now like 21 days to expiration, I want to eliminate the tail risk, the gamma. Gamma is not your friend, it's the accelerator of the delta. When it's not going your way, it's not great at all." A position is a campaign of serial rolls, with 21 DTE as the real expiry each cycle.
• The seesaw, deliberate imbalance 🟢: "I only got 2,000 contracts [calls] versus 5,000 contracts [puts]. The weight of the short puts is a lot more than the weight of the short calls. It's like a seesaw." The put side is oversized precisely so it can fund call-side defense.
• The self-funding roll 🟢: when the stock runs and the call is threatened, "I could increase the strike price from 80 to 100, 110, 120 on the puts, and those 5,000 contracts are going to fetch me a hell of a lot of premium… use those credits to increase the strike price on the short call. I could pay for those debits with the credits from the short put."
• How he compares candidate strangles 🟢 (E0SjbB1y9M0, "PLTR vs HOOD vs NVDA"): fixed columns, contracts · strikes · extrinsic value · capital required · notional · delta both sides. Sample PLTR row: 350 puts @160 (19Δ, extrinsic $183,750) vs 700 calls @260 (12Δ, extrinsic $177,800). Note what he balances: not contract counts, extrinsic value per side.
• Profit zones with stated odds 🟢 (8anZYY_Zf9w): "MSTR just needs to trade between 225 and 400… roll from the 15-day to the 50-day, those 800 contracts pick up easily another $200–400,000… I give that more like a 75% [chance]." And: "The reason I like to trade more is not just because it's less capital intensive, you have a lot more flexibility."

DEFENDD4. The rolling doctrine: the parts beyond the triggers

The three triggers (21 DTE / break-even / 10% extrinsic) are in P6. The rest of the craft:

• State the roll's goal before placing it 🟢: "Whenever you roll, you first have to formulate a goal. The goal is I want to capture $8 more of capital appreciation [$12 → $20 strike] on 5,000 shares, that's $40,000. But the amount I pay to do that has to make sense." A rare paid-debit roll he accepted: $2,823 debit to move $9 → $15 strikes on 6,000 shares = $36,000 of unlocked upside, "my little brain, it was a no-brainer."
• Roll early, while gamma is cheap 🟢: "I like to roll my options when I still have quite a bit of time left on the clock, so the moves aren't so drastic in the pricing."
• "Kick the can" worked example 🟢 (IsnBJjjE8DY): "I went from a 125 strike to a 130 strike and collected an additional $26,000 in credit. So I collected 26, 14, and the initial 23, about $65,000 in premium. I don't have to do anything because there's a lot of time on the clock."
• Roll-until-right, stated at maximum strength 🟢 (hF_-zcBo_Aw): "1,000 contracts representing 100,000 shares. I'm going to roll right until I'm right… going to roll these till 2030, 2035 if necessary." There is no scenario where he delivers core shares, which is why the roll must stay free (P6's net-credit floor).
• Scale out while rolling up, the PayPal campaign 🟢 (rwXTj1mtNmQ): the fork, "the angel and the devil: am I going to keep the strike at 50 and bring in another million dollars in premiums, or de-risk and go 50 → 47.50 or 45, because we get a lot closer to where we're no longer bluffing, we want to take ownership." And the size rule: "Roll from 50 to 55? 55 to 60? Yes, but every time I rolled up I'd take 500 contracts off the table… rock with 1,000 contracts at 60… then maybe PayPal pulls back and I could do it again and scale into it." Rolling up = shrinking; pullbacks = rebuilding.
• Rolling as mechanics 🟢: a roll is buy-this-week + sell-next-period, a calendar spread by construction. "How far out?" is situational: "You have to be familiar with your stock, is there a catalyst, is there a binary event?"

D5. His structure #3: the "Back Stop Trade"

His own term 🟢 (tfU3oFITz6Y): "Back Stop Trade is terminology that's only for this channel, I played baseball. You sold the cash-secured put in the distance, and it's an oversized trade, at a strike where you don't even have to look at it because you want the shares, and they typically paid you about 20, 30, 40% annualized. Then you grab all of that premium and do short-dated stuff with that premium, compounding your ROI."

This is the structure behind the on-X PLTR $50 puts at 500 DTE, and behind "Completion Orders," his name for rungs meant to finish building a position.

D6. Delta, probability, and reading skew in seconds

🟢 "The real easy way to look at delta is what is your percentage of assignment… you can look at 15 [delta] as the percentage it would actually expire in the money." Hence the P3 delta table: 15–25Δ ≈ 15–25% assignment odds (calls/strangles), 20Δ cash grabs, 30–40Δ when he wants shares.

Skew read 🟢: price the call and put equidistant from spot, "$400 south is a two delta; $400 north is a 17 delta… that is just a real quick way to know which way the tide is leaning. This has positive call skew." The heavier delta marks where the market expects movement, and where premium is rich.

MANAGED7. Exits, profit-taking, and what "winning" means to him

• See Profit, Take Profit, his version 🟡: "I'm a huge fan of See Profit, Take Profit. I use premiums to satisfy that itch. I've done a ton of swing trades in my career, after taxes and redeploying capital, it's not cut and dry." Premium income replaces selling shares.
• Share count over cost basis 🟡 (2026-08-14): "I used to be soooo enamored with avg cost of shares. Now I'm way more concerned with total share counts. In 2032 the price today won't matter much imo. But that big ass share count will likely add up."
• The horizon 🟡 (2026-08-10): "Selling puts and calls and using the premiums to stack shares. Hoping to be done stacking by EOY. Then it's about growing the cash pile via cash grabs. Don't intend to exit any positions before 2032."
• The covered call's true cost, in his words 🟢 (MzT06agA6KE): above the strike, "the party stops right there at eight bucks. We are not qualified to participate in any more of the reindeer games. The good news is those premiums, $49,800 and $69,000, help offset that." The remedy is the roll, valued exactly as in D4: "go from $8 to maybe $9 and qualify for another dollar in capital appreciation, on 60,000 shares that's another $60,000. That would be a gimme." ("Gimmes and gotchas" is his standard structure-evaluation frame.)
• Protecting long LEAPS with sacrifice legs 🟢 (nF56RPgO4RA): sold 100 covered calls at $70 against 200 LEAPS, "I could lose $10–20,000 on that particular trade and I'm okay with that, so that my [other 100] LEAPS are free to run."

D8. Put credit spreads: the trap, and his width preference

• The collateral trap 🟢 (yH8Hy2Xm-sA, TSLA 210/205 × 5): "Our 205 protects us from needing $21,000 in capital… mind you this is five positions, so I've got to have essentially $100,000 ready to go for Tesla at any moment. That's where people really drop the ball with put credit spreads, they get lost in the sauce looking at 'hey, I can make a lot of premium.'"
• The personal blow-up 🟢: ENPH 110/105 spreads, "I couldn't roll it because I lost so much that I didn't have the margin to continue." A spread can strand you with no margin left to roll, the failure mode a plain CSP doesn't have. If the spread survives, his repair path: realize the win on the long put, convert the shorts to regular CSPs "because I have the collateral to do so."
• Width: go wide 🟢: "With a five-wide spread the deltas are just offsetting each other, you're almost forced to go the direction of the contract and you're going to be in there forever. Even with a 15–20 wide you can still roll the whole vertical." (Contrast the guest's ⅓-width rule in D10, that assumed $5-wide. Don't blend them.)

D9. Why the tail kills: vega, vanna, and the cascade

🟢 (0x693LMgoB8): "[A drop] is going to accelerate the delta, and it's like a snowball… then you got your vega, then this tertiary Greek called vanna that's going to accelerate the vega, things can spiral out of control very, very quickly." This cascade is the reason for three P-rules at once: the 21-DTE tail cutoff ("the first 50% of the money is a lot easier to capture than the second 50%, that second 50% is called your tail risk"), the 0.75% theta cap, and the 15% stress-test awareness.

DEFENDD10. ⚠️ Attribution: the "WHEELERS" panels are not TJ

Videos titled "WHEELERS…" are roundtables. Rules spoken there are frequently a guest's, and read exactly like the host's. Quarantined here:

• Guest A (How WHEELERS Deal With PUTS): 30–40 DTE · 0.10–0.30Δ · 1.5–2% return on capital ("30 days makes the percent math easy, 1% a month is 12% a year") · avoids assignment on either side at all costs · sells CSPs on margin · rolls up-and-out (calls) / down-and-out (puts) when extrinsic ≤ 10–15¢, ~14 days out.
• Guest B (WHEELERS Talk All Things COVERED CALLS): strike at or above ORIGINAL cost basis (explicitly not adjusted) and ≥ 30% annualized or no trade; happy to be assigned ("even break-even shares are a successful trade, I guaranteed 30%"); prefers rolling out-and-up for another 30% credit; finds this easiest on LEAPS ("30% on premium for a $250 stock when your investment is only $4,000"). ⚠️ Guest B's original-basis rule directly contradicts TJ's adjusted-basis floor (P3). Two different systems.
• The one real TJ datapoint by contrast: Guest A, "I know TJ, you use higher, probably closer to three or four percent." → TJ's ~3–4% per-cycle return target (P3).

🔍 AUDIT: an independent read

My assessment, not his.

What's genuinely good

What concerns me

Before copying any of it

1. Cash vs margin changes everything. Decide which game you're playing before you copy a single number.
2. Naked calls are the line. Everything else is defensible; uncapped short calls on high-beta names can lose more than the account.
3. The strategy needs a bull or flat market. Sustained declines assign everything at once, on correlated names, with compressed BP.
4. The 0.75% theta cap is the one non-negotiable. It's what stands between this and a margin call.
5. "Roll forever" requires rolls to stay free. Paying debits converts a premium strategy into a directional bet.
6. Track realized P&L separately from premium collected. Premium is not profit while the shares are underwater.
7. His edge may be size, not method, 5,000-contract fills, flexibility, and BP treatment retail doesn't get.

Bottom line

The decision framework is genuinely strong, entry gates, tranche sizing, break-even roll trigger, PPD, worth adopting regardless of what you trade. The risk posture is aggressive, leverage, concentration, and naked calls on volatile names. Those are separable, and separating them (his process at a fraction of his risk) is probably the right way to use this document.

📓 EVIDENCE & POSITION RECORD

PORTFOLIOE1. Current portfolio (broker screenshot, ~2026-08-12)

Milestone 🟡 2026-08-07: "BACK OVER $10M! COMEBACK IN FULL SWING", note "comeback" implies a preceding drawdown below it.

PORTFOLIOE1b. Dated portfolio snapshot with YTD P/L (2026-08-17, tastytrade Positions view)

The first true per-name results table found for this trader. Posted 6:37 PM Aug 17 2026 with: "Slowly trying to flip every position green on YTD. I put the odds at like 30% right now bc $MSTR and $BMNR would have to go up quite a bit for that to happen." Transcribed from the image exactly:

What this table establishes, for the first time with real numbers:

• The book is carried by one name. PLTR is +$1.61M YTD; the other nine names NET to −$731,967. Remove PLTR and 2026 is a losing year. (These figures are blended share + option P&L, see the premium note below.)
• Two positions are catastrophic: BMNR −$850,741 and MSTR −$570,504 YTD, consistent with the roll-don't-realize doctrine (P6): both are still open and still being defended.
• MU validates the June rotation (E2b): "moved the $ over to MU… $100B minimum" → +$397,846 YTD. In the replies he adds about PLTR: "She was good for about $2M last year :))"
• SPCX (SpaceX exposure, +$199,545 YTD) confirms the 08-15 "position at $140" statement; note MU trading at $1,018.90, the same ~$1,000 Micron that Papa G rejected on price.
• Cross-check vs the 08-12 screenshot (E1): SOFI improved from −$220,757 total to −$105,757 open; CLSK flipped from −$17,672 to +$30,229 open. The book moves fast at this leverage.

Does this table include his options premium? Yes, and that's the problem

Transcription verified: the P/L Open column sums to $2,048,808.79, matching his own Total row to the penny, so the numbers above are exact.

Premium is in there, but it is not separable. tastytrade's Positions view aggregates by underlying, not by instrument. Every row is shares plus every option leg on that ticker. So:

• P/L Open = unrealized mark on everything currently open, including the mark-to-market on his short puts and short calls. A short put that has decayed in his favor shows up here as a gain even though he hasn't closed it.
• P/L YTD = this year's P&L for that underlying, which does capture closed option trades, i.e. realized premium.

That means +$882k YTD is a blended number: share appreciation and option premium commingled, and no column in this screenshot can pull them apart. You cannot use this table to verify his premium-income claims, and I can't either. It answers "how is each ticker doing" but not "how much of that came from selling premium."

The Open-vs-YTD gap, and why it's genuinely ambiguous

⚠️ Two explanations fit this gap and the screenshot cannot distinguish them:

1. Realized P&L booked this year (closed rolls, assignments, bought-back calls). Under this read, he realized roughly −$1.17M in 2026 while carrying +$2.05M unrealized, exactly what "roll till I'm right" produces: paper gains held, losses crystallized on the rolls.
2. Prior-year unrealized gains rolling out of the YTD window. For a position opened before 2026, P/L Open measures from original entry (including 2025 gains) while P/L YTD measures only 2026. MSTR and PLTR are almost certainly multi-year holds, so much of their gap may simply be last year's profit sitting outside this year's number, not a loss at all. His own reply on that post, "She [PLTR] was good for about $2M last year :))", supports this reading.

Update, 2026-08-17, a data point for reading #1 (does not resolve it). On the same evening as this screenshot he described rolling his SPCX $150 covered calls and volunteered: "I bought to close the $150's and sold to open in the $325 and $350 range for even more premiums than I gave back. But I still booked a realized loss on the $150's." That is his own confirmation that the roll mechanic does crystallize realized losses into the YTD column, which is exactly the process reading #1 describes. It does not size the effect: no dollar amount was given, and it says nothing about how much of the gap on MSTR and PLTR is prior-year gains rolling off. The ambiguity below stands. Only a Transactions tab screenshot can split it.

Update, 2026-08-27 and 2026-08-28, the gap is still there and it got much bigger (still does not resolve it). Two fresh artifacts bear on this section, and neither is a Transactions tab, so E1b remains open.

1. Account panel, 08-27 12:57 PM CT (X post 2093035273328173415). P/L OPEN +$4,261,883.37 against P/L YTD +$459,164.16. Same shape as the 08-17 gap, now −$3,802,719 instead of −$1,166,501. It scaled with the book rather than closing, which is what you would expect if the driver is structural (roll mechanics and/or a transfer-in baseline) rather than a one-off.
2. Per-underlying P/L YTD, 08-28 close (X post 2093473659549626578). The eleven rows sum to +$3,102,043.78. His own account-level P/L YTD one day earlier was +$459,164.16. A $2.64M discrepancy cannot be a single session's move on this book. The per-underlying YTD column and the account-level YTD figure do not describe the same quantity.

⚠️ Read #2 with care: the two figures are a day apart and come from different views, so the exact number is soft. The direction is the point, and it is new: the per-underlying sum now runs far above the account figure, where at 08-17 the same sum (+$882,308) sat well below the +$2,048,809 of open P/L. Whatever sits between them, realized premium, closed legs, fees, the transfer-in basis, is not visible in either image. A Transactions tab screenshot remains the only artifact that would split it, and as of 2026-08-29 he has still never posted one.

Do not treat −$1.17M as a realized-loss figure. It is an upper bound on this year's realized damage, and the true split is unknowable from this image. Resolving it would require his Transactions tab (visible as a tab in the screenshot but never posted) or the daily recap images.

What the table does establish, unambiguously

• PLTR is the entire book. +$1,614,274 YTD versus −$731,967 for the other nine names combined. Strip out one position and 2026 is deeply red.
• BMNR and MSTR are the wounds, −$850,741 and −$570,504 YTD, both still open and still being defended rather than closed.
• He shows no YTD total himself. The Total row's YTD cell reads --; the +$882,308 above is my column sum, not a figure he published.

🔄 What changed between the two books: 08-12 → 08-17

Two full-book screenshots five days apart (E1 and E1b) let us diff the portfolio itself, not just the prices. This is the only place in the project where an actual exit can be observed rather than inferred from talk.

The TSLA exit is the notable one. On 08-12 TSLA showed at $330.89 with +$19,531 total P&L. It is absent from the 08-17 book. The 08-17 screenshot lists more names, not fewer (10 vs 7), so this is not a cropped or partial view: he closed it.

Why that matters for reading his strategy:

• It contradicts the surface impression that he never exits. P6 and D4 document "roll till I'm right," and BMNR (−$850,741) and MSTR (−$570,504) are still open precisely because they're red. TSLA left the book while it was green. That is the pattern: he closes winners, defends losers. It is the opposite of the classic discipline of cutting losers and letting winners run, and it is the mechanism that produces the E1b picture, one giant winner carrying nine names, with the losses parked open.
• A +$19,531 gain on a book this size is noise (under 1% of the +$2.05M open P&L). TSLA looks like a position he simply didn't want, not a trade he managed to a target. He never talks about TSLA on X in the 2026 posts we captured, no share-count statement, no roll commentary, nothing. It was the only name in the 08-12 book he wasn't publicly narrating, and it's the one that disappeared.
• The four adds are all names he was talking about, which supports treating his X commentary as a real leading indicator of position changes: SPCX ("position at $140," 08-15), RIOT (promoted to a 150k share goal, 08-15), MU (the June rotation out of SOFI LEAPS, E2b), ENPH (35k shares in the 08-11 recap image, E4). Every add was pre-announced. The exit was not.
• Practical read: he announces what he's buying and stays quiet about what he's selling. Anyone tracking him should treat the absence of a name from a fresh screenshot as more informative than anything he posts.

⚠️ Caveat on method. An exit here means "present in one full book, absent from a later, longer one." It does not tell us the closing price, the date he actually closed, or whether option legs on TSLA remain. The tracker page applies the same test automatically on every new screenshot: see the tracker.

E1c. Third full book: 2026-08-21, tastytrade Positions view

Posted 6:28 PM Aug 21 2026 with the caption "Staying on the comeback trail" (X post 2090944065256706116). Transcribed from the image exactly. Columns as shown: Symbol, Ask (Buy), P/L Day, P/L Opn, P/L YTD.

⚠️ One reconciliation does not tie. The eleven visible P/L Day cells sum to +$795,294.45, but his own Total row reads +$622,853.45, a -$172,441 difference. The eleven-row list ends cleanly at HOOD with blank space below it, so rows are not simply cut off; the likeliest explanations are option-only positions on underlyings not shown as their own row, or a cash/margin line inside the total. It is not resolvable from this image, and it is flagged here rather than smoothed over. The P/L YTD total cell again reads --; he still publishes no YTD number of his own.

🔄 What changed: 08-17 → 08-21

Eleven names against ten, so the longer-book test that validated the TSLA exit applies here too: nothing was dropped, and no exit can be read out of this pair.

NBIS is a premium trade, not a conviction buy, and he says so. He opened it 08-20: "Collected $220k in premiums for agreeing to buy $1.5M worth of $NBIS at $150 6 months from now. Gives them plenty of time to sort things out" (post 2090488853823922309), followed by "Off to a promising start on the $NBIS premium cash grab!!" and, on 08-21, "The promising start on $NBIS continues!! I still don't know much about the company. Couldn't even tell you who the CEO is." Its P/L Open and P/L YTD are the identical +$16,300, consistent with a position days old. No share count was ever stated, so the tracker carries it without a dollar impact.

Two YTD wounds healed materially in four days. MSTR went from -$570,504 to -$91,834 YTD (+$478,670) and BMNR from -$850,741 to -$577,741 (+$273,000), on MSTR rallying from $97.99 to $122.29 and BMNR from $18.80 to $23.71. Nothing about the doctrine changed; the two positions he refused to close simply moved his way. That is the roll-till-I-am-right playbook working in the direction it needs to, and it is worth recording that this run caught it, because the same page recorded those losses when they were open.

RIOT gave back its gain: +$7,350 YTD on 08-17 to -$718.50 on 08-21, while he was buying 25,000 more shares of it.

E1d. Share counts by name: the "MANUFACTURE THE WIN" infographic (2026-08-22)

Posted 12:18 AM Aug 23 2026, figures reconciled to the Friday Aug 22 close, as a two-slide graphic captioned "Our own V Shaped recovery in full swing! Feels good realizing who I truly am in the market. I like to own shares and that's ok. It might not be the most capital efficient on paper, but it's also something I can walk away from and still be ok. I love to sell options, but they expire and must be managed in most cases." (X post 2091394640423370838).

This is the first per-name share count he has ever published for the whole core book. Slide 2, headed "The mission: own 8 companies outright by 2032, funded by premium, not deposits":

Footer boxes: FLOOR (THE PROMISE) $100M · AIM (GOAL BOOK) $113.00M · MARGIN OF SAFETY $13.00M · FUNDED BY PREMIUM, under the banner "$100M IS THE MINIMUM, NOT THE MAXIMUM."

⚠️ This slide is NOT his complete book and must not be diffed as one. It is explicitly the eight companies he intends to own outright, and it omits three names the 08-21 Positions screenshot proves he still holds: BMNR, HOOD and NBIS. BMNR in particular is discussed as a live holding that same weekend ("Thinking of adding 500 leaps to the $BMNR bag!!", 08-22; "$BMNR shares are for sale at $25", 08-22). The ledger therefore records it as a partial snapshot, excluded from the add/exit diff and used only for share counts.

Slide 1, "Where we stand heading into next week, as of Friday, August 22, 2026", Family Office, account ending in 60:

⚠️ His date label is wrong. The slide reads "as of Friday, August 22, 2026", but August 22 2026 is a Saturday. The underlying session is Friday August 21, the same close as the E1c Positions screenshot: his PLTR ask of $179.82 there matches the $179.94 Friday close. The two artifacts describe one and the same day, which is why the E1d share counts and the E1c prices are used together in the ledger.

The net-liquidity chart on that slide is labelled $17.0M peak, $6.92M, Jun 24 low, $13.50M now.

Positioning table: Net posture leaning long ("raised the call ceilings on the winners"); Accumulated "+63,500 shares this week"; Ceilings raised "MSTR to $165 · PLTR to $230"; Dry powder "52.5% buying power in use."

⚠️ His own accumulation line does not add up. The named adds are "RIOT +25K · CLSK +15K · SPCX +9.5K · MSTR +8K · ENPH +5K · PLTR +2.5K · MU +1K · all premium-funded", which sum to 66,000 shares, against the stated headline of +63,500. The 2,500-share gap is in his graphic, not in this transcription; both figures are recorded as published.

The -$1,362,117 YTD figure is the first YTD total he has ever published. It does not match the +$882,308 column-sum from the 08-17 Positions screenshot (E1b), and it points the opposite way: deeply negative. The two are measuring different things, a broker per-underlying YTD column versus whatever aggregate he built this graphic from, and the gap is unexplained. Do not treat either number as the account's true 2026 result.

On the losses being "cut nearly in half": that phrasing implies the YTD figure was roughly -$2.7M at some earlier point in 2026. He has never published that number either.

E1e. The brokerage transfer: a third possible explanation for the E1b gap

Under the 08-23 graphic post, a reader asked: "I can't help but notice the big drop happened after switching platforms. Do you think switching brokerages had anything to do with it?" TJ replied:

"When we switched we only had stocks and cash. The stocks went down in value a couple of million during the transfer. So we were already swimming up stream from day one for sure."

This bears on the E1b Open-vs-YTD ambiguity, and it cuts against reading #2 there. Reading #2 assumed P/L Open measures from original multi-year entry, so prior-year gains would sit outside the YTD column. If the account was transferred into tastytrade during 2026 holding only stock and cash, the broker's P/L Open baseline for those names is the transfer-in basis, not the original 2020-2024 entry, and far less prior-year gain is available to explain the -$1,166,501 gap. It also independently establishes that a couple of million dollars of value was lost during the transfer itself, which is neither trading P&L nor premium and appears in no column of any screenshot.

⚠️ It does not resolve E1b. No date for the switch, no dollar figure beyond "a couple of million," and no statement of which names moved. A Transactions tab screenshot is still the only thing that would split realized premium from share P&L, and as of this run he has still never posted one (the Transactions tab is visible and unselected in both the 08-17 and 08-21 images).

E1f. Fourth full book: 2026-08-28, and the week that turned the year green

The screenshot (X post 2093473659549626578, 5:59 PM CT Aug 28 2026, caption "$PLTR still holding onto the top spot for the year but $MU is closing in quickly. It can pass it if it catches a bid to about $1200 or so."). tastytrade Positions tab, sorted by P/L YTD. Columns shown are Symbol / P/L YTD / D'sOpn / DTE, with no prices, so it cannot re-baseline anything. It confirms who is still in the book.

The Total row's YTD cell reads as a dash again; the sum is mine, not his.

What changed: 08-21 to 08-28

Book composition: nothing. The same eleven names, no additions, no removals. Third full book in a row with no new ticker since NBIS arrived on 08-21.

But two share positions are gone, and they are gone by his own statement rather than by inference from a missing row:

Source: the 08-24 "MANUFACTURE THE WIN" moves table (X post 2091979733894389790), whose North Star slide shows both at 0 shares / PUTS ONLY, with the note "RIOT and CleanSpark show zero shares today, I sold the stock to raise cash for the MSTR melt-up, but their put backstops stay in place." His framing: "it's capital allocation, not abandonment... Move the capital, keep the backstops, never leave a slot behind."

⚠️ This is the case a ticker-list diff would have missed. RIOT and CLSK are still rows in the 08-28 Positions screenshot, so a symbol-list comparison shows no change. What survives under those symbols is the short-put backstop, not stock. The share legs are marked exited in the ledger as of 08-24 and are no longer priced.

EVIDENCEThe other moves of the week, from his daily recaps

He describes 08-24 as 16 trades, all live on stream, and says cash went from $467K to $2.81M (6x) "without touching a dollar of new deposits."

PORTFOLIOShare counts, 08-27 North Star slide (X post 2092998814231675021)

⚠️ The goal column is not fixed. Between 08-24 and 08-27 he restated MSTR's goal from 25,000 to 35,000 (so a 140%-complete slot became exactly 100%), MU's from 5,000 to 5,500, and ENPH's from 35,000 to 40,000. The "goal book" headline moved $113.00M to $122.50M in three days. The target moves with the position, which makes "% there" and "6 of 8 complete" weak as progress measures. BMNR, HOOD and NBIS are held but appear on no North Star slide.

The account went green on the year

A +$1.82M YTD swing in four trading days, and the first positive YTD figure on file for him. His own framing (08-27 recap, posted 10:32 AM CT): "GREEN ON THE YEAR... net liquidity at a fresh all-time high of $15.28M, up over $1 million on the day... From $6.92M to $15.28M is +112% in about two months." He attributes the turn to one structural change: "the drawdown to $6.92M happened on naked strangles, premium on both sides, no shares underneath, nothing to catch the fall. The fix was to make the strangle COVERED."

⚠️ Both 08-27 figures are intraday. The recap graphic went out at 10:32 AM CT and the tastytrade panel at 12:57 PM CT, both before the 3:00 PM CT close, and they disagree ($15,281,973 / +$412,574 versus $15,328,563.70 / +$459,164.16). Neither is a confirmed session close. He posted no recap graphic at all on 08-28.

⚠️ Do not net this against the tracker total. His figure is the whole account including every option leg and all premium collected; the tracker measures share legs from a disclosure price. They answer different questions.

E1g. The first week of September: two closes, a share ledger, and a year that keeps crossing zero

Covers 2026-08-31 through 2026-09-05. No new tastytrade Positions screenshot appeared in this window, so the last complete broker book on file is still 08-28 (E1f). What did appear is a new artifact type, the "Northstar Bag" slide, plus two daily moves tables that state two position closes outright.

The Northstar Bag: a share-ownership ledger, not a book

Slide 3/3 of the 09-01 and 09-02 recaps. It is not the Positions tab and must never be diffed against one: by his own footnote, "A name only counts here once we actually hold shares in it, so the numbers stay real." Option-only rows are excluded by construction.

Footnote, both days: "Every share above was bought with option premium, never new deposits... RIOT and CleanSpark aren't in the bag yet (zero shares, building via their put backstops); they'd add $19.5M once we take the stock." Banner: "CLEARS THE $100M FLOOR WITH 6 OF 8 NAMES."

⚠️ His stated universe here is 8 names: these 6 plus RIOT and CLSK. BMNR is not one of them. BMNR was in the 08-28 Positions book and was his worst name there at −$588,240.89 P/L YTD. Its absence from the Bag proves nothing on its own, since the Bag lists share holdings only and BMNR has never had a disclosed share count. But being left out of his own eight-name framing is new. The tracker marks BMNR stale, not exited, per the ambiguity rule. Only a fresh Positions tab settles it. ✅ RESOLVED 2026-09-11, see E1h: the fresh Positions tab shows BMNR still on the book at −$463,740.89 P/L YTD. It is a 1,500-contract Jan-2028 $25 call LEAP with zero shares, which is why the share-only Bag never listed it. Not an exit.

Two stated closes

Both come from his own "Every move, and why I made it" tables, so neither is a snapshot inference.

⚠️ Read those two rows together. On Tuesday he closed NBIS specifically to fund more HOOD, extending the HOOD puts all the way out to September 2027. On Wednesday he bought the entire HOOD put position back. Both moves were captioned as "simplifying the book". Neither position was ever shares, so neither ever touched the tracker's dollar total, but a 24-hour round trip on a position he had just extended by twelve months is the clearest example on file of the churn his recaps present as discipline.

The other moves in the same two tables:

⚠️ The ENPH arithmetic does not close. Our base was 42,500 shares on 08-27. He says he bought 5,000 and is "now 50,000", which is 47,500, not 50,000. His screenshot count outranks his buy-post arithmetic under the ledger rule, so 50,000 stands and the missing 2,500 is an undisclosed lot somewhere between 08-27 and 09-01.

The year crossed zero twice more, once inside a single day

He published two recap graphics on Tuesday 09-01, both headed "Daily recap, Tuesday, September 1, 2026". The weekday labels are correct this time, unlike the 08-22 slide.

In four hours on 09-01 the day's loss doubled and the year flipped from +$259,051 to −$296,557, a $555,608 swing. Across twelve days his YTD figure has now crossed zero three times: −$1,362,117 (08-21), +$459,164 (08-27), +$259,051 (09-01 intraday), −$296,557 (09-01 close), −$272,395 (09-02).

His framing on the red day: "A real drawdown today... No panic here: September is likely a down month, and we played it with discipline, not drama... Green years are built by surviving red months." And the caption: "Suffered a bit of a drawdown today! When you own 400k+ shares, this comes with the territory. I've always wondered how Warren Buffett handled the fluctuations of owning millions of shares. WILD."

The 09-02 theta figure carries his own annotation: "$44,294 / day = $1,328,820 / month if it holds."

Still no Transactions tab

⚠️ Checked again this week: he posted no Transactions screenshot. The E1b ambiguity (the −$1,166,501 Open-vs-YTD gap that is either realized losses or prior-year gains rolling off) remains unresolved, and the YTD figure crossing zero three times in twelve days is exactly why it matters. Every account total on file is still self-reported and unreconciled.

E1h. Fifth full book: 2026-09-11, the BMNR question answered and a $899K error on his own slide

Covers 2026-09-06 through 2026-09-12. A new tastytrade Positions screenshot appeared on Friday 09-11 (X post 2098515365173030957, 3:53 PM CT, captioned "YTD on all the tickers! Biggest surprise is $SPCX and the biggest dissappointment is $SOFI. Who do I think finishes first? $BMNR! I know, I know."). It is the fifth complete broker book on file and the first since 08-28. Nine minutes earlier he posted the weekly "MANUFACTURE THE WIN" recap (X post 2098513190594228659, 3:45 PM CT, three slides), so this week gives us the broker book and his own narrative side by side, taken from the same afternoon.

The book itself (2026-09-11, tastytrade Positions view)

Every Last in that column matches the 2026-09-11 close to within two cents (yfinance), so the screenshot is a genuine end-of-session read, not a stale panel.

🔄 What changed: 08-28 → 09-11

• Added: none.
• No longer in the book (2): HOOD, NBIS.
• Held through both: BMNR, CLSK, ENPH, MSTR, MU, PLTR, RIOT, SOFI, SPCX.

Neither drop is a new finding. Both were stated closes in his own moves tables two weeks ago (NBIS on 09-01, HOOD on 09-02, see E1g) and were already logged as exits then. The 09-11 book simply confirms them. On composition, his book did not change this week.

✅ The BMNR question from E1g is now answered, and answered the other way

E1g flagged BMNR as stale rather than exited, on the grounds that his own eight-name Northstar framing had stopped mentioning it and only a fresh Positions tab could settle it. The fresh Positions tab settles it: BMNR is still on the book, at −$463,740.89 P/L YTD, still his worst name by a wide margin.

Slide 2/3 of the same day's recap says what it actually is:

BMNR lotto LEAP · +$190K open · waiting · "1,500 Jan-2028 $25 calls, the moonshot, ready if BMNR melts up toward $100"

So BMNR is a long-call position with zero shares. That is why it has never appeared in a Northstar Bag (share holdings only, by construction) and why his "6 of 8 names" framing excludes it: his eight names are the six share names plus RIOT and CLSK, which are share-less by intent. BMNR is a ninth thing he does not count. The tracker now carries it as held at 0 shares, which keeps it visible without letting it move a share-leg total it cannot move. Its P/L YTD improved from −$588,240.89 (08-28) to −$463,740.89 (09-11), a +$124,500 recovery, while he publicly picks it to "finish first".

⚠️ His Northstar Bag slide misprices PLTR by $19.98 a share

Slide 3/3, the Northstar Bag, 2026-09-11:

PLTR did not trade at $187.21 on 2026-09-11. It closed $167.23, and his own Positions screenshot, posted nine minutes later, shows Last 167.21 and Ask 167.61. The Bag slide is internally consistent with the wrong number (45,000 × 187.21 = $8,424,450 exactly, and the 2032 column checks out at 45,000 × $500), so this is a bad price input carried through the arithmetic, not a typo in one cell.

The damage: the PLTR line is overstated by about $899,100, so the headline "VALUE TODAY $28.4M" should read roughly $27.5M. Every other name on the slide matches the Positions screenshot to the cent, which is what makes the PLTR line stand out. The tracker takes its refs from the Positions screenshot for exactly this reason.

This is the second arithmetic problem in his share ledger in two weeks; the 09-01 ENPH count did not close either (E1g). Neither is evidence of bad faith, both are evidence that the Bag slides are assembled by hand and should not be treated as a broker record.

Share counts: 416,000, and two lots that appeared out of nowhere

His moves table this week is explicitly scoped "The moves, since the last update (Sep 9 – Sep 11)", which is why it accounts for only 5,500 of the 13,000 new shares. The other 7,500 (2,500 PLTR, 5,000 ENPH) were bought in the undisclosed Sep 3 to Sep 8 window. Nothing suspicious about that, but it is worth stating plainly: his published moves tables do not cover every session, so the share ledger cannot be rebuilt from them alone. The screenshot counts are the only complete record, which is why the ledger rule ranks them above the buy posts.

The three moves he did publish:

The account: a fresh high, and the year green again

Slide 1/3 is headed "Loaded ENPH & MU all week, now positioned to cover-and-deliver" and labelled "week ending Friday, September 11, 2026". The weekday label is correct this time (Sep 11 2026 really is a Friday), unlike the 08-22 slide.

The year has now crossed zero a fifth time. The full sequence: −$1,362,117 (08-21) → +$459,164 (08-27) → +$259,051 (09-01 intraday) → −$296,557 (09-01 close) → −$272,395 (09-02) → +$741,967 (09-11). That is a +$1,014,362 swing in nine days. Net liquidity is a fresh high, +$1.01M on the 09-02 read and +126% off the $6.92M June 24 low.

His theta annotation: "+$46,138 / day = $1,384,140 / month if it holds." The four-word conditional at the end is his, and it is doing a lot of work.

The two cash grabs, priced for the first time

Slide 2/3 puts figures on the share-less positions that the tracker cannot value:

His summary: "Both cash grabs are working (~$374K YTD combined) and the BMNR moonshot is loaded, the whole book is pulling its weight." The Bag footnote repeats that RIOT and CleanSpark hold zero shares and "they'd add $19.5M once we take the stock", which independently confirms both 08-24 share exits are still in force.

EVIDENCEMethod statement, 09-12

A separate post the same weekend (X post 2098632735669497987, 11:40 PM CT Sep 11) states the size of the backstop trade in his career for the first time:

"Backstop Premium Cash Grabs are my bread and butter plays. It's an oversized bet on a stock you'd love to own if you get your price. I shoot for at least an annualized return on capital of 25% or more. These trades are responsible for at least 50% of all the $ I've ever made selling options. They are super low maintenance also... You look up 6 months later and you're up 40 to 50% in most cases... Extrinsic value is your protection against early assignment... Based on my research, not a lot can happen for CLSK to go to $0. Intend to ride this play to 50% and then roll up or out for more credits."

🟡 Unverified self-report, but it is the first time he has quantified how much of his lifetime option income comes from the D5 structure rather than the covered-call ladders the channel is named for.

⚠️ Still no Transactions tab

Checked again this week: no Transactions screenshot. The 09-11 artifact is the Positions tab, the same view as every previous one; its P/L YTD column is precisely the column whose meaning E1b cannot pin down. So the E1b ambiguity (the −$1,166,501 Open-vs-YTD gap, either realized losses or prior-year gains rolling off) remains unresolved, now for the fifth consecutive full book. With the YTD figure having crossed zero five times in three weeks, it remains the single most valuable artifact this project is still missing.

E2. Position & size statements (X, dated)

• 08-22, PLTR single-name screenshot (post 2091184396527149364), the clearest evidence yet for the negative-basis claim: PLTR Stock 35,000 shares with Cost -$4,671,266.60 and P/L Open +$1,625,903.40. Option legs on it: -300 Feb 19 230C, -300 Mar 19 270C, -300 Jun 17 330C, -300 Dec 17 400C, -1,000 Dec 17 120P. His caption: "When running a covered/naked ladder campaign, my goal is to capture 70 to 75% of the upside move while having some protection to the downside. Overall position delta is above 21k share equivalent so that's decent. On a melt up, that delta will drop significantly depending on the speed of the move. Those are some of the gimmies and gotchas. You can't have some protection to the downside and unlimited upside simultaneously the way I choose to play the game."
• 08-19, MSTR single-name screenshot (post 2090188318902292549, captioned only "$MSTR position"): 30,000 shares, P/L Day +$505,600, P/L Open +$688,353.37, P/L YTD -$248,353.63. Legs: -250 each Oct 16 125C, Nov 20 165C, Dec 18 185C, Jan 15 225C, Mar 19 250C, Jun 17 300C, plus -1,000 Dec 17 100P. He was at 33,000 shares by the 08-22 table.
• 08-19, SOFI backstop puts rolled up: "Rolled up $Sofi puts (backstop trade) from $10 to $15 for a cool $420k in premiums! Taking on a lot more risk..." This is the D5 Back Stop Trade being levered up, not reduced, on a position already at 250,000 shares.
• 08-20, NBIS opened as a short-put premium trade: "Collected $220k in premiums for agreeing to buy $1.5M worth of $NBIS at $150 6 months from now." Followed on 08-21 by "I still don't know much about the company. Couldn't even tell you who the CEO is." See E1c.
• 08-22, BMNR still held and being added to: "Thinking of adding 500 leaps to the $BMNR bag!!" and, separately, "$BMNR shares are for sale at $25." This is what rules out reading the 08-22 eight-company graphic (E1d) as a complete book.
• 08-17 (9:51 PM ET), day's buys posted in plain text: "Shares purchased today. 2500 Shares of $RIOT, 2500 Shares of $SPCX, 100 Shares of $MU. Closed $150 covered calls on $SPCX for a loss. Sold more calls at higher strikes for way down the road." ⚠️ These buys happened before the 08-17 close, so they are already inside the E1b Positions screenshot taken that evening; the ledger's share counts were deliberately not incremented, which would double-count them.
• 08-17, SPCX call roll, with a rare explicit admission that a roll booked a loss (reply): "Technically I did roll, but not all in one step. I bought to close the $150's and sold to open in the $325 and $350 range for even more premiums than I gave back. But I still booked a realized loss on the $150's." See the E1b note below on why this matters.
• 08-17, META floated as an idea, no position: posted a Yahoo Finance quote page (META $568.97, −13.80% YTD, at close Aug 17) with "Sooooooo is this one of the most obvious plays in the market from a company that has limited downside and huge upside??" In replies he adds "That is what has always made Facebook hard for me as well. I've made $ with it but I can't stand the actual business." No share count, strike, or trade was disclosed, so META is a watchlist name, not a holding, and is not in the ledger. Worth watching: every add in the 08-12→08-17 diff was pre-announced this way.
• 08-17, SOFI covered calls (reply): "I can roll it. Not too big a deal tbh. SOFI is a long term hold. I can wrestle with those covered calls for years and it not affect anything I'm trying to do. Also the short puts would be printing."
• 08-16, IREN: eyeing 10k shares as a swing trade, exit $75
• 08-15, MSTR: adding ~5k shares; "MSTR at $300 is a cool $9M for the portfolio"; call ladder offsetting share losses
• 08-15, RIOT & CLSK promoted to 150k share-goal positions; buying BTC again (~⅓ coin, "very small bet"); BMNR "totally wrong about the timing," still holds; SPCX position at $140; CLSK: "I got assigned 5k shares at $9"
• 08-14, PLTR to 35k shares ("2nd only to SOFI as the stock that has made us the most $$$"); MU & SOFI "finally flipped green for the year"
• 08-11, SOFI >100k shares, covered calls at $25 on never-sell shares; added SOFI short puts, +$242k premium; "3 Premium Cash Grabs fighting for 8th spot in the $100M North Star: CLSK, HOOD, RIOT"
• 08-10, HOOD CSPs: own-at-$60, $88k premium while waiting (−250 contracts, Feb 19, 192 DTE); CLSK $9 puts (−2,000 contracts, Dec 18, 129 DTE, $190,328); dropped RIOT puts in one account, "BPR was horrible and CLSK is a similar business and cheaper by share price"
• Historical, PLTR covered calls "a pain in the ass for like a year on that crazy run-up"; bought 5–10k extra shares, closed the calls at a big loss, sold those shares immediately
• Jan 2026 scale disclosures 🟡: "What are my 250k shares and 5k LEAPS called?" · "trying to hold the 100k shares all the way to $500, splits adjusted"
• AMZN ladder (Feb 2026), a clean structural snapshot: "agreements to buy Amazon at $220, $200, $180 & $160 while also having an agreement to sell at $285, 25 days from now", legs shown: −1,200 × 285C (25d, cost $111,600, P/L −$6,000) · −200 × 220P (Sep 18, 228d, +$23,400) · −200 × 200P (Nov 20, 291d, +$33,320)

• 09-01, 400,500 shares owned, from the recap graphic and the caption "When you own 400k+ shares, this comes with the territory." 09-02, 403,000 shares owned after the PLTR buy-write. These are the first totals he has published as a headline metric on the recap slide rather than only inside the North Star table.
• 09-01, ENPH position declared full: "$Enph position is full unless it dips under $30. Don't worry, you'll love it at $50. Nobody likes buying the dip." (post 2094856750557979098). Consistent with the Bag holding ENPH flat at 50,000 the next day.
• 09-02, TSLA exit confirmed in his own words: "We owned $SPCX and $TSLA for a bit but decided on rocking with $SPCX only bc of premiums" (post 2095289969401077762). The tracker had already inferred the TSLA exit from the 08-12 to 08-17 book diff; this is the first time he has stated it.
• 09-03, on the RIOT backstop: "Backstop trade on $RIOT was one of the easiest trades I've ever made. Thanks Mr. Market." (post 2095519740185678244). He is still adding to it: 2,500 more Jan-28 $10 puts on 09-02 for +$527K, while holding zero RIOT shares.
• 09-05, calls sold against a falling book: "Thank Goodness I sold the calls. That takes off a little sting since shares are doing nada bueno." (post 2096149444060209197). No figures given.
• 09-05, on concentration: "In case you haven't figured it out, I value Concentration over Diversification. That's just me." (post 2096033228704317620).

EVIDENCEE2b. 2026 timeline, Feb-Jul highlights (X, dated)

Rows already quoted elsewhere in this dossier (45-60 DTE, lab rat, buying power, PLTR 500-DTE park, "other people's money," cash-flow-as-oxygen) are not repeated here.

E3. Trade journal: his own on-air numbers

Not complete records, he narrates positions; he doesn't publish a blotter.

Closed / realized:

Open (walked through on camera):

🔴 Losses & mistakes he admits on camera:

EVIDENCEE4. Sample daily recap (image, ~2026-08-11): what his real ledger looks like

Also visible: cash balance $1,876,255. 3,747 such images exist, the only true trade-by-trade ledger, readable one image at a time only.

E5. Return claims (unverified)

• "$715,000 in cash to generate $521,000 in premiums over 121 days" → 73% ≈ 421% annualized, computed live via Grok, on margin-reduced collateral, favorable window. "This is a game of math, guys."
• Open questions never established: lifetime P&L, total premium collected, win rate, account history beyond the $10M reference.

🧾 SOURCING & METHOD

• YouTube: 66/68 long-form transcripts pulled (~250k words); the two missing had no captions. Strategy density concentrated in ~15 videos, key ones: CASH SECURED PUTS 101 (YHaoqE4Eu48), Now let's talk COVERED CALLS (WxuMkA6neGI), the $500K live panel (0x693LMgoB8), How I'm Fixing My COVERED CALLS (IxkVqiRib1w), Are Your COVERED CALLS in Danger (w9CimJxLD80), Will Your Shares be Put on YOU (IsnBJjjE8DY), the whiteboards (KDC0WNX0RUY, E0SjbB1y9M0, 8anZYY_Zf9w, rwXTj1mtNmQ, MzT06agA6KE).
• X: 146 unique posts captured via dated search slices (Jan–Aug 2026); profile-timeline scraping does not converge (details in NEW_TRADER_GUIDE.md / HANDOFF_TRADER_RESEARCH.md). Practical harvest cadence ~20 min between waves.
• Attribution rule: anything from a "WHEELERS…" title is a panel, confirm the speaker (D10).
• Biggest remaining gap: the 3,747 daily-recap images (E4). Second: pre-2026 X history (reachable, slow). His portfolio walkthroughs are livestreams; several have no captions.
• Terminology quick-key: cash grab · campaign vs trade · North Star ($100M) · roster spot (~8) · share goal · ladder/rungs · Completion Order · back stop · PPD · BPR · gimmes & gotchas.